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Editor’s Urban Development Journal: 
Coliseum Choices: 
An Asset Too Valuable to Demolish 
 
Professor Will Macht, Editor 
 
 
 
The Threat 
With the recent City action to approve the concept for development of a soccer stadium at PGE 
Park and a minor league baseball stadium at the Rose Quarter to replace the Memorial 
Coliseum, a valuable asset owned by the City stands in jeopardy. Combined with Paul Allen’s 
Arena Corporation’s desire to develop an entertainment district at the Rose Quarter, there are 
twin threats to the Coliseum that magnify the importance of understanding both the value of 
the historic modern icon and the opportunity cost of bowing to the calls to demolish it. 
 
The Asset 
The 272,000 SF Coliseum, valued at $57.1 million tax RMV, a fraction of its replacement value, 
was designed in the modern International Style by the internationally renowned architecture 
firm Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM) and built 50 years ago, just long enough to qualify it 
for placement on the National Register of Historic Places. Its design and construction are at one 
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and the same time elegantly simple and enormously sophisticated. There is a concrete bowl 
sitting inside a square glass box, 360 feet long on each side. The two structures are 
disconnected from one another. The entire 130,000 square-foot box is held up by only four 
cruciform concrete columns, outside the bowl. That provides unobstructed sight lines inside 
the bowl, which is ideal for large events. 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, after the four columns were constructed, the steel truss roof was the first thing built for 
an elegantly simple reason. In the rain-soaked Northwest, the roof was built as an umbrella to 
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shelter the construction of the concrete bowl inside. That concrete bowl is a very sophisticated 
structure with a graceful curve at its perimeter, (shown in the photograph on page 3 above and 
the image below), rising along the east and west sides to give more seating in the middle. 
Moreover, the concrete bowl is cantilevered, not only lightening its profile but also creating 
about 30,000 square feet of usable but unused space under its sheltering form. This is 
particularly felicitous because standing on the concourse on the west side, one overlooks the 
Willamette River, all the downtown Portland skyscrapers and the burgeoning Pearl district. 
 
 
 
The Coliseum still has 40,000 square feet of space, as large as a Portland city block, in an 
exhibition hall under the plaza on the east side [left]. Formerly, it had been 60,000 square feet 
but the construction of the Rose Garden reduced its size. Nevertheless, that can be very useful 
space not only because of its size but also because it is accessible at grade from the north side.  
 
 
The Memorial 
 
A sunken courtyard between the 
exhibition hall and the Coliseum provides 
a calm, reflective space, with a reflecting 
pool, for the Veterans’ Memorial. But 
perhaps the real memorial to the veterans 
is the clear expression of American 
ideals that are expressed in simple, 
transparent forms and innovative 
engineering for a civic space in which all 
Portlanders can gather for a variety of 
communal functions.  
 
Note that the glazed Coliseum is transparent, 
in contrast with the Rose Garden, and has 
worked equally well housing Portland State 
University graduations, Barack Obama and 
Ralph Nader political rallies, concerts and a 
wide variety of sports including basketball, 
hockey games and tennis matches. 
 
The undulating concrete bowl was designed 
not only to be visible from across the river 
but also to be lower than the roof to admit 
natural daylight into the bowl, as one can 
see in the image below. Therefore, the 
space was ahead of its time in interacting 
with the environment. Moreover, when in 
use, the Coliseum acts as a beacon visible 
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from downtown inviting citizens to it. The blackening curtains that surround the bowl when 
darkening was needed are no longer operable and are left closed, thereby depriving the interior 
of the benefit of daylight. The glass box is recessed to float above a concrete plinth. 
 
Sustainability 
In many ways the Coliseum is located 
and designed to better  f i t  a  
sustainable future than most of the 
buildings of its age. It is now one of 
the most accessible sites in Portland 
by both rail and road. It is situated at 
the intersection of two light rail lines, 
north-south and east-west, one of 
which goes directly to the airport.  
 
If high-speed rail is ever to come to 
Portland, it must come on the east 
side and would pass below the 
Coliseum right where it connects to a 
major transcontinental rail line. At the 
intersection of the major north-south 
and east-west freeways in Oregon, 
travel to and from it is direct and 
easily accessible.  
 
The Coliseum’s 130,000 square-foot roof, the size of 3.25 city blocks, is totally unshaded and 
flat, lending it well to an enormous array of photovoltaic solar collectors. Its glass walls on all 
four sides are only single-paned windows 
ostensibly making it an energy hog. However, with 
the addition of a second glass skin on the interior, 
what is an energy waster could become an energy 
producer because the glass walls themselves 
would become solar collectors trapping heat. With 
appropriate ducts at the roof, 
that heat generated could be 
moved to where it is needed, or 
it could be exhausted, providing 
insulation and cooling. As the 
sun moves around its glass 
walls, the Coliseum could collect 
more heat than most other 
kinds of structures. In fact, 
progressive buildings in Europe, 
like the Commerzbank tower in 
F r a n k f u r t ,  w e r e  d e s i g n e d  
according to the same principle.  
Therefore, the Coliseum could be 
a trailblazer in retrofitting iconic historic buildings for energy efficiency far more sustainably 
than would its demolition and replacement by new construction of a baseball stadium. 
 
Efficiency 
 
Constructing the Coliseum’s pure form also produced great efficiency. To build the Coliseum, 
concrete trucks drove right in on a depressed entry on the north side and out on the south. 
They can still do that, which makes it simple to bring large shows into and out of the lower 
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level. It also permits the demolition of the bowl in such a manner as to maintain the integrity of 
the glass box for other uses in the unfortunate case that it should it not be feasible to find a 
valuable program and uses for both the bowl and the box.   
 
 
  
Reuse Options 
 
It is critical to review some of the options for reuse of the Coliseum. Seven years ago in the 
Spring of 2002, I taught a 3-month long Real Estate Development Workshop in my class of 
graduate urban planning and development students at the College of Urban Affairs at PSU 
which produced four alternative uses for the Coliseum that deserve consideration – a 
headquarters hotel, an arts complex, a sustainable technology center and an urban home 
center. We also considered two more options - the Howell proposal to transform it into the 
Coliseum Transportation Center for high-speed rail, commuter rail, light rail and streetcar 
integration [above] and the Obletz plan to convert it into the Memorial Athletic Recreation 
Center (MARC) with pools, ice rink, basketball and tennis courts, [below and next page]. 
 
 
 
The last flurry of creative proposals seven years ago followed the City’s commissioning of an 
urban design plan in 2001 by Pittsburgh-based Urban Design Associates that would have 
demolished the Coliseum in favor of an urban street grid and Pearl District style development. 
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After widespread public resistance and an outcry by the veterans, that plan was abandoned. 
Similar resistance greeted developer proposals to convert the Coliseum to a Costco or Home 
Depot. Why should its total demolition for a minor league baseball stadium now be acceptable? 
 
The PSU workshop was based on separate class sessions 
we had with a broad cross-section of stakeholders 
including, among others, developers J. Isaac of the 
Oregon Arena Corp. [current proponent of an 
entertainment center], Doug Obletz of Shiels, Obletz 
Johnson [SOJ, current proponent of the MARC athletic 
complex], Jim Winkler of Winkler Development Corp. 
and developer of the nearby Adidas Village. 
 
We also had separate sessions with 
other mentors including: Michael 
McElwee [PDC headquarters hotel project manager]; architects Paul Falsetto 
of SERA [Coliseum historian], Randy Higgins of HOLST, Jim Howell [transit 
advocate formerly of Tri-Met and BOORA] and Doug Nichols of OTAK as well 
as market economist Jerry Johnson [Johnson Gardner], contractor Darhl 
Edwards [Hoffman Construction]; planners David Knowles of SOJ [formerly 
City Planning Director] and Larry Dully [formerly PDC Development Director] 
who conducted the studies on the Coliseum for the City of Portland; 
botanists Fred Nilson [Hoyt Arboretum] and Carolyn Devine [Berry Botanic 
Garden]. Presentations were critiqued by Oregonian architecture critic Randy 
Gragg, Portland city finance executive David Logsdon, former chief-of-staff 
for Commissioner Charles Hales Ron Paul [proponent of the James Beard 
Public Market], and architect and planner Nohad Toulan, founder and Dean 
Emeritus of the College of Urban & Public Affairs. 
 
In an effort to help inform public debate and assist public policy decision-makers, here is a 
brief summary of the four adaptive re-use plans the workshop developed at that time: 
 
Headquarters Hotel 
At the intersection of three light rail lines, the two main interstate highways and the potential 
high-speed rail corridor, and served by over 
12 bus routes within Fareless Square, a 650-
room headquarters hotel built within the 
glass box would permit conventioneers to take 
light rail directly from the airport to their 
hotel and convention center and easily go 
downtown. When inter-city high-speed rail is 
built, the hotel’s west side would become its 
the front door to Portland. 
 
Re-using the enormous glass box, measuring 
3.25 blocks and more than seven stories high, 
the project was conceived as a hotel inside a 
botanic garden. Unlike enclosed central 
atrium hotels, four glazed corner atria, each a 
glass cube 60 feet per side, would look out 
over the city and across the Willamette and 
each would form a microclimate representing 
the diversity of Oregon biomes. Every room 
would have a view. Cafés and restaurants 
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would fill the base of each atrium and would become inviting places not only for conventioneers 
but also for other Oregonians and visitors open to the public on a 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-a 
week basis, much more accessible than even wholly public uses. 
 
Unlike the potential headquarters hotel site across MLK Boulevard from the Convention 
Center, the Coliseum is visible from the I-5 freeway and from downtown, primary criteria for 
hotel location. And since a headquarters hotel cannot survive on convention business alone, 
the short 5-minute walk from the Coliseum to the Convention Center, through three existing 
public plazas, gives it just enough separation to attract Rose Garden guests, business travelers 
and tourist visitors, thereby assisting its economic viability. The two hotels and OCC are 
already connected by a light rail line and pedestrian streetscape on Holladay Street. 
 
 
 
Some critics have said that a headquarters hotel needs at least 800 rooms. But in fact, PDC’s 
criterion is a block of 400 to 500 rooms, which can easily be accommodated in the Coliseum 
and would be the only nearby hotel to do so. There is more than enough space for an additional 
400+-room tower to be built when, as and if the market can support more rooms. This phasing 
option would lower the development risk. 
 
Why would this work when prior PDC efforts failed? 
• The City already owns the land, building and parking. 
• The Coliseum already has 40,000 SF public space, a large extra cost for new facilities. 
• Coliseum requires the lowest possible public subsidy. 
• Lower subsidies mean less resistance from existing hoteliers. 
• No new taxes are required. 
• Adaptive reuse cost savings lower required capital. 
• The separate hotel identity could better attract business and leisure markets. 
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The Coliseum hotel would be a less expensive public-private project that is feasible because the 
public would continue to own the land, building and parking, which it need not finance, as well 
as the capital improvements, which would be financed with tax-exempt revenue bonds as many 
other cities have done for their headquarters hotels. Private developers under contract with the 
city would assume the risks of cost overruns and private hotel management companies would 
assume the risk of operating losses. Profits would be divided between the public and private 
sectors. 
 
The Coliseum headquarters hotel would use all of the transit advantages of the site, re-use an 
architecturally historic building, reinvigorate the Rose Quarter, support the Convention Center, 
minimize on-site parking demand, act as a transit center, bring both weekday daytime and 
nighttime use on a consistent basis to an area used sporadically, provide both construction 
and permanent jobs and increase the tax base. Moreover, it would do so in a less costly and 
less risky way than any other headquarters hotel alternative. And it would be the only re-use 
option that meets all those criteria. 
 
 
 
Portland Memorial Arts Center 
 
At the time when the BODS [Ballet, Opera, Drama, Symphony] group were each seeking new 
venues, [an Oregon Ballet Theater, Portland Opera House, Portland Center Stage Theater and 
Oregon Symphony Hall] the Coliseum offered the only site where all four could be 
accommodated at the lowest capital costs and with the greatest operating savings. In turn this 
could lead the organizations to lower ticket prices, to expand the market to younger and less 
affluent groups and achieve greater solvency, a rare feat among arts organizations. 
 
A Portland Memorial Arts Center 
[PMAC] could adaptively re-use both 
the existing bowl as well as the glass 
box, preserving its architectural 
heritage. The bowl could be divided 
into four main spaces housing the 
major users, and there would be 
enough space for a variety of other 
uses in the large complex: 
• 2,200-seat symphony hall 
• 2,000 seat dance and opera 
house 
• 500-seat dramatic theater 
• 200-seat black box theater 
• 2,000-Seat Cinema [or up to 
10 smaller ones] 
• 10,000 SF Northwest Film 
Center studios 
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• 80,000 SF broadcast center for Blazer Cable, KXL & Action Sports Network 
• 20,000 SF rehearsal, storage and rentable practice space 
• 15,000 SF restaurant and cafés expanding to a 10,000 SF terrace overlooking 
Willamette River & downtown 
• 10,000 SF art books and music store 
• 400-space parking garage built into the western bank topped by a restaurant terrace 
 
The benefits of co-locating this broad array of users and uses are several. Combining broadcast 
studios bearing uplink capacity with live performing arts facilities permits simulcasts of special 
events that can increase both the audience for, and income stream to, arts organizations. 
Increasing the capacity for events of varied scales can expand the penetration of the market for 
arts to younger and less affluent segments. Moving to the east side of the river could also 
demonstrate the city’s commitment to support the arts beyond its traditional base on the west 
side and among what some call middle-aged culture vulture patrons. 
 
 
The economic development impact can be considerable. Studies have estimated that over 
10,300 people were employed in the arts in Portland producing an economic impact of more 
than $318 million and attracting more than 6.3 million attendees to Portland arts events in 
2006. That has helped Portland expand its population of the 25 to 34 age group to the top tier 
of American cities, and has led to the creation of a growing group of new local businesses based 
upon both the arts and new communications media. The variety of auditoriums and meeting 
spaces less than five minutes from the Convention Center could expand the venues in which 
Convention events could be held during the daytime when the arts facilities are less used. 
In 2002, estimated capital costs of the 
PMAC were $47 million, far less than the 
total of separate facilities, and comp-
arable to the cost of the baseball stadium. 
The capital cost savings of housing a 
variety of performance facilities means 
that expensive infrastructure such as 
bathrooms, kitchen facilities, loading 
docks, HVAC and security systems can be 
shared among many users, unlike the 
initial BODS proposals for separate 
facilities. 
Operating savings could be continuous 
using shared employees for such things 
as box office activities, lighting and set 
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design and construction, technology equipment operation and maintenance, janitorial and 
security services. Adding the broadcast center, retail shops, restaurants and cafés would 
provide over $1 million of annual income. The Oregon Film & Video Office could relocate 
and/or stimulate more arts production at PMAC. These income streams, combined with an 
increase in the revenue stream flowing from market expansion and media programming, 
coupled with all of these operating economies, could assist the PMAC to become a self-
sustaining arts and media center for the region, a truly sustainable development. 
 
Sustainable Technology Center [STC] 
The Coliseum could also be a place to create an urban center of sustainable technology that 
would house applied research and development, manufacturing, and services, which would be 
anchored by energy and environment related government offices. The large footprint and 
seven+-story height of the building can be used create an urban alternative to suburban flex-
space with over a 560,000 square feet on four floorplates. The 130,000 square-foot flexible 
floorplates are larger than commonly available in the suburbs. Supported by light rail and 
streetcar transit, as well as about 2,500 existing parking spaces at the Rose Garden that are 
 
vacant during the day, the STC would have a parking ratio of 4.5 spaces per 1,000 square feet, 
far more parking than most suburban flex-space projects. At the intersection of three light rail 
lines and within Fareless Square, it is likely that transit could serve most of its users.  
 
This plan could create space for over 2,000 jobs in the central city at a location that is 
especially attractive to the creative young urban dwellers likely to work at the STC. To make 
the project feasible, it would be anchored by the energy and environmental programs of nearby 
government offices and utilities, all of which have headquarter offices only blocks away. 
1. BPA 
2. State of Oregon 
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3. Metro 
4. Tri-Met 
5. Multnomah County 
6. Pacific Power 
 
In addition, other targeted users could 
be private research, development and 
manufacturing, academic research and 
other institutional users, energy and 
environmental engineering firms and an 
array of green technology companies. 
The PDC has listed solar cell 
production, fuel cell production and 
power control equipment as three areas 
in which the Northwest could build a 
niche. Electric vehicle design and engineering could be another. Sustainable technologies also 
include those connected with wind, geothermal and hydropower energy design and 
development and as well as conservation materials, techniques and control systems. 
 
An STC would build on Portland’s solid and growing reputation as a leader in sustainable 
development where it already houses a leading school of environmental law (Northwest School 
of Law at Lewis and Clark University), the China-US Center for Sustainable Development, 
EcoTrust, and the Portland Office of Sustainable Development. The recent $25 million grant 
from the Miller Foundation is helping to make Portland State University and academic leader in 
sustainability. The STC would give Portland a downtown sustainability applied development 
and production facility to complement academic research. 
 
The Coliseum itself can be rehabilitated to be an outstanding example of adaptive re-use 
according to the best green building techniques. The 130,000 square-foot roof is large enough 
to become an efficient eco-roof providing insulation reducing cooling loads, absorbing storm 
water and holding a 3.25-acre array of photovoltaic solar collectors providing power to the 
building. The large glass walls would provide natural light and, with the addition of another 
internal glass wall, provide a natural tempering chamber that will either bring heated air into 
the building or exhaust it from it using relatively simple control systems. By providing counter-
cyclical weekday daytime use of an under-utilized historic building and supporting existing 
city-owned garages, an STC would advance principles of urban density.  
 
This STC project would be economically feasible because the City already owns the land, 
building, and parking. The total development cost was estimated in 2002 to be $65 million, 
which included $14 million for tenant improvement allowances at $25 per square foot. At low 
discounted rents that could then be as low as $9.00 per square foot, averaging industrial and 
office space, the STC could produce about a $4.5 million net operating income stream that 
could support about $50 million of the capital costs, using tax-exempt industrial revenue 
bonds to provide low-cost financing. Students estimated that the project would require only 
about $15 million in grants, which should be possible to obtain from government economic 
development funds and foundation sustainability grants. 
 
A Sustainable Technology Center would support multiple goals of job creation, economic 
development, sustainable development, urban revitalization, reduced commuting, transit-
supported development and historic preservation. 
 
Urban Home Center 
 
In March 2002, our Development Workshop pointed out that, among other things, the 
Coliseum is the quintessential big box. At the same time, large format retailers that have 
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saturated the suburbs were looking to tap into lucrative urban markets but find sites difficult 
to find or neighborhoods resistant to their entry. The Coliseum could overcome both of these 
challenges and offers an urban alternative to the single-level behemoth big box in a sea of 
parking. 
 
While it was clear then that big-box retailers were profitable and that almost any selection of 
them could succeed at the heart of a regional market of 1.8 million people with over $33 billion 
of income, students concentrated only on those who were not then represented in the 
marketplace, would support an urban housing lifestyle and could attract customers also to 
downtown and to Lloyd Center, as a retail bridge between the two. These objectives excluded 
retailers who had saturated the region, such as Costco, Home Depot, Lowe’s, Target and Wal-
Mart. Should the City decide to approve an Urban Home Center, it should adopt these criteria. 
 
Rather, we looked at international retailer IKEA whose 
nearest location then in suburban Seattle attracted 
many Portlanders. IKEA’s typical minimum store size 
is 260,000 square feet, which is precisely two floors of 
the Coliseum. IKEA is accustomed to a two-floor 
concept and many of its stores have glass walls. 
Moreover, the column-free interior space is ideal for 
large format retailing. Urban dwellers in smaller 
apartments and condominiums often use the type of 
affordable folding and modular furniture in which 
IKEA specializes.  
 
IKEA would also have been co-located with an Expo 
Design Center, as it is in Palo Alto, CA. Expo Design 
Centers were mainly conceived as showrooms with 
fully furnished lifestyle vignettes featuring the products and design and construction services it 
provides to customers and their contractors. They occupied about 130,000 square feet, just the 
size of one floor of the Coliseum. The third major type of retailer appropriate to the Coliseum, 
and one which would fit nicely into its 40,000+ square-foot exhibition hall, would be a Crate & 
Barrel outlet store, none of whose 13 outlets is currently in the northwest. 
 
One must recognize that adequate parking must be available to serve this volume of large-scale 
retail. In order to maintain the transparency of the glass box and reveal the retail activity 
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within, students located two floors of parking for more than 900 cars within the concrete base 
of the Coliseum. In addition, the City owns about 2,500 existing spaces in its Rose Garden 
garages that are under-utilized except during large events.  Unlike those events, retail traffic is 
spread throughout the day and week so more efficient utilization could be expected. Counting 
all spaces potentially available when no event was held at the Rose Garden, there could be a 
very high parking supply of over 8 spaces per 1,000 square feet, attractive to retailers. 
 
Some may object to bringing automobile-
oriented retailing to an area so well served 
by transit. Unlike typical retailing, only 
small furniture is carried home via personal 
car and all larger items are delivered. 
Therefore, one might expect that more than 
normal numbers of customers would come 
via transit. A large number of employees 
would also likely use transit. 
 
At an estimated development cost in 2002 
of $61 million, and with a net operating 
income of approximately $7 million, an 
Urban Home Center should be financed 
privately and might be expected to return at 
least about $3 to $4 million annually. Since 
the city owns the land, the building and the 
parking, it is reasonable to expect that a 
substantial portion of that should flow to 
the city. In addition, the real estate tax revenue on a leasehold interest should be expected to 
be well in excess of $1 million annually. The City might choose to use some of those funds to 
support a smaller-scale athletic complex with competition swimming facilities envisioned in 
other Coliseum plans. 
 
Beyond economic benefits, an Urban Home Center could revitalize the Rose Quarter with non-
event activity and act as a retail bridge between downtown and Lloyd Center that complements 
both and broadens the selection, quantity and price of available goods. It also would support 
urban housing and could reduce regional auto trips. 
 
[Please note that although each of the four proposals above incorporated a veterans’ memorial 
as part of the project, this summary excluded consideration here, but one could and should be 
incorporated in any chosen alternative.] 
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Coliseum as Coliseum 
 
Strangely, the use for which the Coliseum is most well adapted has received the least attention 
––– as a Coliseum. One must understand the basic deal structure to surmise reasons for the 
lack of attention. 
 
The Deal Structure 
 
At the time of the construction of the Rose Garden, the City executed an operating agreement 
providing that the same manager manage both the Coliseum and the Rose Garden. While Paul 
Allen’s Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC) has the obligation to cover any operating losses at the 
Coliseum, it must pay 60% of any net income from the Coliseum to the City, retaining 40% of 
net income as a management fee. Events at the Rose Garden are not so burdened. While the 
City may have believed that the agreement was favorable to it, one must realize that it is in the 
economic interest of the manager to hold just enough events at the Coliseum to keep it at a 
breakeven level, but no more because there is not incentive to exceed that level, especially 
when all the profit is available for holding the same event in the Rose Garden. The agreement 
does not address or resolve that conflict of interest. 
 
In addition to receiving 40% of the net income from the Coliseum as a 
management fee, the OAC passes the full costs of operating the two 
parking garages owned by the City, including OAC’s management 
fees, on to the city along with any parking revenues generated by 
events at the Coliseum. This does not constitute an incentive to hold 
more events at the Coliseum. The City is obligated to pay for all capital improvements to the 
Coliseum as well as all major repairs and maintenance. Since the Coliseum has been kept at a 
breakeven point, the City has had no incentive to repair and improve it.  
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Development Rights: Public or Private Use Questions  
Furthermore, the Oregon Arena 
Corporation was granted and enjoys 
development rights for any non-public 
development that would occur on the 
Coliseum site but has no such rights 
for public development. It is in the 
City’s sole discretion to determine that 
the Coliseum is not needed for any 
public use. It is in OAC’s economic 
interest for the City to declare there is 
no public use for the Coliseum, and 
over the years it has advocated 
solutions that demolish it.  
 
Can the City truly declare, without a 
complete professional evaluation and 
fully open and transparent public 
process, that no public use exists for 
the Coliseum? Can the City really 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Coliseum is not a viable public use and, even if so, 
that no other public use could take its place? Should the City investigate other deal structures 
to maximize the value of its assets? Should it actually negotiate and try such other deal 
structures for a reasonable time before it takes the radical step of demolishing an historic icon 
right before it can be nominated and accepted on the National Register of Historic Places? Why 
should the same private entity manage both facilities? 
 
Management by Metropolitan Exposition Recreation Commission [MERC] 
 
In 1990, the City transferred management of both the Coliseum and Civic Stadium-(PGE Park) 
to MERC, which also manages the Oregon Convention Center [OCC], the Portland Center for 
the Performing Arts [PCPA] and the Portland Metropolitan Exposition Center [EXPO]. That 
placed in a single public manager all the publicly owned facilities that could accommodate 
large events. In 1992, the City pulled the Coliseum management from MERC and transferred it 
to Paul Allen’s Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC). Nine years later, in 2001, the City transferred 
management of PGE Park to the private sports firm Portland Family Entertainment, which later 
defaulted on its agreement with the City. In both cases, private management of public facilities 
has led to adverse economic consequences for the City. Since the Coliseum is only five minutes 
from the Oregon Convention Center, and since the Coliseum already offers a variety of venues 
in which to hold public convention and conference events, and could add more as outlined 
above in the section about the arts center, why should not MERC again manage both facilities 
to their mutual benefit? Since MERC also operates the performing arts center, including the 
Keller Civic Auditorium, would it not make more sense for it to have a venue in which to stage 
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large events, concerts and festivals?  Would not Coliseum rock, folk and country music 
concerts produce additional profits that could offset losses at smaller venues? 
 
As described, the deal structures for both the Coliseum and PGE Park have revealed conflicts 
between public and private interests that have impeded the success of publicly owned facilities. 
MERC is subsidiary of Metro, our elected regional government, and MERC’s board members 
represent Metro, the City of Portland, and Washington, Clackamas and Multnomah counties. It 
has a professional staff with broad experience in real estate management, entertainment, film 
and television production, arts administration, marketing and sales. The Coliseum is currently 
the responsibility of the City’s Office of Management & Finance, which does not have similar 
experience or transparency. 
 
The City also owns the parking garages for approximately 2500 cars that are mostly empty 
during the week, during the day. Are there other uses of the Coliseum that could help generate 
weekday revenue from those parking spaces? Are there ways to amalgamate the best elements 
of the various elements of the creative proposals that have been made within the context of the 
existing Coliseum? For example, could a substantial portion of the 80,000 square feet of the 
lower level be leased as a broadcast center to both facilitate dissemination of events that occur 
above and generate continuous income to offset operating expenses of the Coliseum?  
 
Could the concourse level be leased for a large restaurant overlooking the Willamette as 
proposed in the arts solution? Could the east side under the cantilevered bowl be leased for 
sale of books or other merchandise? Could a portion of the 40,000 square feet in the Exhibition 
Hall be leased for a fitness center, or classrooms or a myriad of other uses especially during 
weekdays? Could the concrete bowl, with its stadium seating for 12,000 people and electronic 
communications equipment, supplement the Convention Center for general sessions for large 
conferences during weekdays? Are not political conventions held in precisely those kinds of 
venues? 
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As noted by Brian Parrott (Portland Tribune, April 2, 2009), the head PSU tennis coach, 
Portland would “give up a significant competitive advantage that the city has in attracting 
events that other cities cannot accommodate because we have two world-class arenas side by 
side. Example: The U.S. vs. Russia Davis Cup Final that we won the right to host because we 
have the Memorial Coliseum that can provide dates that very busy buildings cannot bid for. 
That event brought an estimated $7 million to $10 million to the city and filled up every hotel 
room available. Philadelphia is the only other U.S. city that has two such buildings, and they 
are going to tear down the Spectrum. Portland will become the only U.S. city to be able to host 
events that cannot find a location in a major metropolitan area.” 
 
Does it make any 
economic sense to 
demolish an historic icon 
for which so many uses 
have been developed to 
spend at least $55 
million building a new 
baseball stadium that 
would operate only six 
months of the year and 
house only about 70 
home games? What will 
produce revenue there 
on the other 295 days of 
the year? In a rainy area 
like Portland, why does it 
make sense to demolish 
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a covered, enclosed and heated venue usable year-round for a multiplicity of uses with an open 
one usable only half the year, and then only for a single use? Why try to raise $55 million in 
new debt when about $28 million still remains of the debt to convert PGE Park for baseball? 
Why should the City rush to demolish the Coliseum at the end of this year when no public 
process has considered all the alternatives? 
 
Public Policy Questions 
 
As a matter of public policy, for all the reasons and questions raised in this article, is it difficult 
to find a logically consistent sustainable public purpose based upon sound economics, rational 
urban planning and development, conservative architectural historic preservation, progressive 
transportation planning, environmental integrity, respectful veteran memorial integrity and 
equitable social policy to justify the demolition of a valuable public asset?  
 
At the height of the deepest recession since the Great Depression, when Oregon’s 
unemployment rate is the third highest in the nation, when the incomes of those employed are 
falling with involuntary furloughs, when homelessness is rising and even food banks 
experience shortages, when school budgets are being cut and tuitions are rising, and when the 
City cannot even maintain roads without raising parking fees, how would demolition of the 
public asset of the Coliseum advance public responsibility to protect and enhance public 
property? Why is the City considering demolishing public assets in such a cavalier fashion, on 
such a short timeline, before thorough investigation and public evaluation of all alternatives? 
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In this article alone, we have discussed seven different alternatives, each of which would 
preserve the Coliseum in whole or in part. The best in terms of preserving the public’s 
economic, historic, civic and public investment may well be the simplest, improving and 
operating the Coliseum as a Coliseum, under the management of MERC. How can the City 
decide, in a period of weeks, after private discussions with only two companies owned by 
wealthy families who each advance their own private interests, to demolish an historic 50-year 
old public asset that has not only served the community well but also offers a wide array of 
rehabilitation and reuse options? Would Portland be making the same mistake that New York 
City did when it demolished the historic Pennsylvania Station? 
 
  
 
The Hippocratic Oath to which every doctor swears allegiance is to do no harm. Do not City 
Commissioners owe the same allegiance to public citizens who elected them? What sense of 
public priorities and public interests does this course of action reveal and why should the 
public support any City Commissioner who advances it? When city leaders publicly purport to 
create “the most sustainable entertainment district in the United States”, is it not incumbent 
upon them to show how demolition of a complex that can itself be an embodiment of energy 
efficiency is sustainable? The accepted criteria by which sustainable projects are measured 
have been the triple bottom line summarized by the three “E”s – economy, ecology and equity. 
Where are the studies by independent experts that show that a single-use, minor league 
baseball stadium operating for 70 home games can support a $55 million public investment, 
plus the economic value lost, with an existing venue that can operate 365 days in all weather 
with a multiplicity of uses? Where are the independent studies showing that the energy to 
destroy all the materials and embodied energy that comprise the Coliseum, added to all the 
materials and energy to build a baseball stadium, produce a net positive ecological result?  
Where are the independent studies to show that social equity is advanced more by 70 baseball 
games over six months versus admission to graduations, concerts, rallies, conventions, 
exhibits, festivals, hockey, basketball, tennis, figure skating and other spectator events over an 
entire year? When a public entity contemplates destroying a public asset, is it incumbent upon 
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it not only to publicly examine all alternatives, but also to produce a cost benefit analysis 
showing that all alternatives are inferior to the chosen one? Should the city first do no harm? 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully yours, 
 
William P. Macht 
Professor Will Macht 
Editor, Center for Real Estate Quarterly 
Associate Director, Center for Real Estate 
machtw@pdx.edu 
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The Credit Crisis in Commercial Real Estate 
  
Christopher Longinetti, Senior Vice President, ScanlanKemperBard Companies 
 
 
 
It is very difficult to argue with the premise that the current financial turmoil is without 
modern comparison, or that its impact will be anything less than generational in its severity.  
The current lack of commercial real estate (CRE) financing is a tremendous challenge 
confronting both owners and investors and has significant ramifications with respect to 
underlying property valuations.  However, at its core the credit crisis is a lending crisis and as 
such it does share common elements with past banking failures.  While financial markets are 
experiencing unprecedented disruption, it seems negligent to ignore these commonalities, 
particularly when trying to understand the impacts on commercial real estate and why the 
worst may very well be yet to come for this market.  The more challenging aspect may be in 
understanding just how severe it can get for the commercial real estate market as the many 
underlying causes and fundamental challenges ahead are truly without peer as the market 
attempts to restore some measure of liquidity.   
 
The Savings & Loan Crisis 
 
The last lending crisis with significant implications to the commercial real estate market was 
the savings and loan crisis [S&L] of the 1980s.  From 1986 to 1995, over 1,600 FDIC-insured 
institutions were either closed or received federal assistance.  Over 1,000 of these institutions 
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with assets of $500 billion failed.  The cost of the S&L crisis is estimated to have totaled 
approximately $160 billion, of which about $125 billion was directly paid for by US taxpayers. 1  
That lending crisis, the recession which accompanied it, and in particular the actions of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), chartered with the directive to liquidate the assets of these 
failed institutions, defined the commercial real estate industry during the late 1980s and into 
the early 1990s. 
 
In a 1997 examination of the S&L crisis, the FDIC’s Division of Research and Statistics 
identified four common elements of recessions associated in large part from bank failures.  
These common elements were:  
 
1. Recession followed a period of rapid expansion with external factors exacerbating 
cyclical forces.  
2. Speculative activity was prevalent and opinion, rather than fact, supported optimistic 
expectations. 
3. Wide swings in real estate activity contributed to the severity of the recession; and  
4. Boom and bust activity in commercial real estate markets was one of the main causes 
of losses at both failed and surviving banks. 2  
 
The first three elements are obvious in their relevance to the current financial crisis. However, 
the parallels to current residential markets are unmistakable.  For market participants, these 
factors most certainly apply as well to the commercial real estate market of 2005 - 2007 which 
makes the fourth element particularly alarming.  By and large, banks have not yet experienced 
significant losses with respect to their commercial real estate loan portfolios, although the 
market almost unanimously agrees that these losses are coming and that they will likely be 
sizeable.  
  
The Credit Cycle 
 
Underlying the business cycle is the credit cycle.  Ready access to affordable capital spurs 
investment and fuels expansion.  These periods of liquidity generally lead to periods of excess 
liquidity followed by contraction and relative drought as the cycle turns downward.  Periods 
where credit flows easily can just as quickly end in periods of excessive tightening before 
returning to more sensible loan underwriting standards.  Where the current crisis deviates 
from history most profoundly, particularly with respect to CRE lending, is the sheer magnitude 
of this most recent credit cycle, first on the way up and now in it’s relentless down cycle. 
 
In understanding this credit cycle, it is important to understand the process by which financial 
institutions extend credit and, for the purposes of this analysis, the focus is specifically on the 
process by which financial institutions extend credit to the owners of commercial real estate.  
Within lending institutions, this process is referred to as loan underwriting and encompasses 
the quantitative and qualitative assessment of relative risk.   
 
Debt is a fixed return vehicle which receives scheduled payments of interest and principal.  As 
a result, when assessing risk from the lender’s perspective, considerable attention is paid to 
downside underwriting:  How much can the asset underperform and still produce the 
underwritten return?  This is a significantly different perspective than that of the equity 
investor seeking the loan.  Investment upside, property performance exceeding expectations, 
accumulates to the equity interest as the property owner.  Better than anticipated property 
performance for the lender, other than providing for a greater measure of loan safety, does not 
provide the windfall returns that accrue to the equity holdings.   The lender still receives only 
                                                 
1  Source: FDIC, The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography 
2  Source: FDIC, History of the 80s: Volume I:   An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s 
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the scheduled payments of interest and principal, unless the lender has been granted 
participating income or equity kickers.  
 
Risk Considerations   
 
This perspective is particularly evident when discussing the standard risk considerations of 
commercial real estate loan underwriting which involve loan-to-value ratios, debt service 
coverage ratios, credit support and loan covenants as outlined in the table which follows.   
 
Risk Consideration Definition 
Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV) Total Loan Amount ÷ Total Property Value 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) Net Operating Income (NOI) ÷ Interest and Principal Payments (Debt Service) 
Credit Support Additional Collateral or Borrower Guaranties 
Loan Covenants Ongoing Loan Conditions (e.g. minimum levels or cash flow or maximum levels of leverage) 
 
Beyond the standard analysis of the property attributes (age, appearance, local market factors, 
location, etc.) these considerations define a relative risk tolerance for any loan by framing (1) 
the lender’s exposure within the context of fair market value, (2) the cash flow available for the 
payment of debt service, (3) a borrower’s ability to repay the obligation, and (4) the lender’s 
ability to safeguard its loan.        
 
Conservative Loan Underwriting Standards 
 
Immediately following the S&L crisis, CRE lending was governed by a strict adherence to 
conservative loan underwriting standards characterized by modest LTV ratios, strong DSCR, 
personal borrower guaranties and a rigorous structure providing for regular loan performance 
tests.  However, beginning in the mid-1990s, the commercial real estate embarked on what 
would end up being twelve consecutive years of market growth and value increases. During 
that period, diligent underwriting encountered a record CRE up-cycle.  Conscientious lending 
standards combined with stellar performance of the underlying real estate and provided for 
record low default rates in loans secured by commercial properties.   
 
In turn, CRE loans established a solid track record of strong returns on investment and 
appealing risk-adjusted returns.  Market participants increased their allocations to CRE-
backed assets.  Others expanded their investment portfolios then to include investment in CRE 
loans, attracted by greater income and capital protection than that provided by riskier equity 
investments.  This emergence of a viable investment market for CRE loans, and the seemingly 
limitless demand which followed, promoted further investment and unprecedented liquidity for 
commercial property acquisitions.  The secondary lending market, as the primary vehicle for 
these investors seeking to put money to work in commercial real estate, changed the nature of 
CRE investment in a relatively brief time period.       
 
The secondary lending market, or securitized lending, refers specifically to loans originated and 
sold, or syndicated, to secondary market participants.  Across all real estate lending platforms, 
this securitization process converts originated whole loans to mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
and, specifically for commercial properties, to commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).  
The dynamics of this market differ greatly from the more traditional commercial real estate 
lending model, which is referred to as the primary lending market or balance sheet lending.    
 
In its simplest form, the primary lending market can be thought of as a local bank providing a 
loan for a local property to a neighborhood operator or long-time client.  The market relies on 
relationship lending, as the originating bank or institution will be holding the loan in its 
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portfolio for the life of the investment.  In doing so, the lending institution genuinely becomes a 
partner with the borrower until loan maturity.       
 
Securitized Lending Process 
 
By way of contrast, the securitized lending process relies upon a third party intermediary to 
aggregate multiple loans and resell a collection of asset pools as individual new securities.  An 
originator is responsible for the initial underwriting and funding of the loan.  The originator 
sells the loan to a third party intermediary, typically an investment bank, referred to as the 
issuer, who would be responsible for assembling the pools of loans into the CMBS security, 
which are then sold in the market to individual investors (see figure 1).3  The growth of the 
CMBS market, and its resulting impact on CRE lending, cannot be understated.  The CMBS 
market, which first emerged in the mid-1990s, rapidly transformed real lending from one 
centered on local primary lending institutions to a global investment market where investors 
worldwide could pool funds to lend.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The growth the CMBS market corresponded with, and in large part fueled, the growth of CRE 
lending in general.  In 1995, there were $1.0 trillion in outstanding CRE loans of which 5.4% 
were CMBS.4  By early 2001, the CMBS market supplanted insurance companies and pension 
funds as the largest holders of CRE debt behind banks.5 CMBS issuance swiftly increased as 
the market demonstrated strong performance and rapidly decreased delinquencies (See figure 
2).  By 2005, CRE loans outstanding totaled $2.62 trillion and CMBS represented 37% of the 
market.  At the market peak in 2007, roughly half of the new CRE debt originations were 
intended for the CMBS market, which had a tremendous impact on liquidity and pricing in the 
commercial real estate market, as will be demonstrated later in this discussion.  
 
                                                 
3 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
4 Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert, Wachovia Securities and Mortgage Bankers Association 
5 Source: Nichols, Joseph; CMBS World, Summer 2007.  
Figure 1 – Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
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CRE lending was seen as providing an appealing risk-weighted return and CMBS were the 
primary investment vehicle for those outside the primary lending market.   
 
CMBS Default Rate 
 
As illustrated in figure 2, the CMBS default rate had historically averaged approximately 5.0%.  
However, in the periods that followed, delinquencies began declining rapidly, eventually falling 
to a record low 0.28% at the end of 2007.6 Loan terms began loosening and underwriting 
standards eased dramatically.  Institutions took larger risks, compounded by the reduction of 
risk-mitigating covenants and structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This easing of credit and the ongoing bull-run of the CRE market, spurred unprecedented  
 
 
This easing of credit and the ongoing bull-run of the CRE market, spurred unprecedented 
investment in commercial properties and demand for CRE loans.  In 1988, total commercial 
mortgage debt outstanding was approximately $1.0 trillion.  Over the next ten years, total 
commercial debt outstanding had expanded to approximately $1.2 trillion, representing a 
modest market growth rate of approximately 1.5% per year. 
 
 
The decade which followed experienced much more rapid growth. By 2008, the U.S. market 
had $3.4 trillion in commercial debt supporting $6.5 trillion in investment-grade, income-
producing real estate.  From 1998 to 2008, the commercial mortgage debt market had 
experienced annual compounded growth of almost 11 %.   
 
                                                 
6 Source: Business Wire, January 17, 2008 
Figure 2 – Source: Lehman Brothers  
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Interestingly, depository institutions were not necessarily crowded-out by the CMBS market 
and maintained a relatively stable proportion of the overall marketplace. However, the  
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, depository institutions were not necessarily crowded-out by the CMBS market 
and maintained a relatively stable proportion of the overall marketplace. However, the 
securitized market was leading the way and, in doing so, began to deviate significantly from the 
lending standards that had been established by the primary lending community.  The 
securitized market had effectively removed the originator as an investment companion of the 
borrower.  The originator and the third-party intermediary securitizing the loan were often the 
same group.  Loans originated and packaged to secondary market participants carried with 
them no vested interest beyond what could ultimately be sold to the market. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies 
 
In turn, the market relied almost exclusively on the credit monitoring by the major credit rating 
agencies, hired by, and on behalf of, the third-party intermediaries to assess the underlying 
risk.  Loan originators increased maximum leverage ratios, replaced amortizing loans with 
interest-only ones, and in general began lending more aggressively on more volatile assets such 
as land and other non-cash flowing investments.   In turn, these loans were packaged and sold 
to the investors of CMBS who, by now, were more than comfortable with the safety of these 
investments given demonstrated past performance, AAA-credit agency ratings, and a track 
record of decreasing delinquencies.  This is particularly true of loans originated in 2006 and 
2007, which are generally considered the worst of the CMBS vintages. 
 
Depository institutions generally followed suit.  In order to compete with the secondary market, 
underwriting standards loosened.  Additionally, small to mid-size institutions increased their 
exposure and concentration to commercial real estate, encouraged by the performance of their 
Figure 3 - Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts 
Commercial Mortgage Debt Outstanding by Source of Funds 
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outstanding loan portfolios and low delinquencies.7  Market participants began to talk of 
fundamental changes in the commercial real estate markets.  Cap rates’ compression was 
fueled by suggestions that the liquidity premium had been eliminated from the market, given 
readily available capital for investment.  Particularly in the office sector, market participants 
pointed to the relative lack of new construction as the practicing of a new market discipline 
that would temper the traditionally cyclical nature of commercial real estate.  “This time it’s 
different” was an expression of the collective market consensus and the only thing better than 
today were the prospects of tomorrow. 
 
Commercial Real Estate Market Peak 
 
In hindsight, with a tremendous amount of money pouring into commercial real estate, and no 
shortage of available financing, it was only a matter of time before the market overheated.  CRE 
transaction volume increased 233% from $118 billion in 2003, to $276 billion in 2005.  In 
2007, investors channeled a record $417 billion into commercial real estate in the United 
States, financed in part by $233 billion in CMBS.8   
 
The market peak did come in early 2007 with the sale of the Equity Office Properties Trust 
(EOP) portfolio to the Blackstone Group.  Blackstone paid $39 billion for 573 properties that 
EOP had amassed over its thirty-year history to consummate the largest private equity deal in 
history.9  Blackstone, in turn, then sold almost 70% of the portfolio within six weeks for $27 
billion to 16 different companies.   The transactions broke sales volume and cost-per-square 
foot records in major markets throughout the country, including locally where San Francisco-
based Shorenstein Properties purchased 4.0 million square feet of Portland office properties for 
approximately $1.2 billion, roughly $300 per square foot.  In most cases, buyers financed the 
portfolio purchases aggressively, but none more aggressive than New York investor Harry 
Macklowe’s purchase of the 6.5 million square feet of New York City properties he purchased 
from Blackstone for $7.5 billion, or $1,100 per square foot.  The entire purchase was financed 
with short-term debt and only $50 million of cash contributed by Macklowe.  Essentially, the 
entire $7.5 billion purchase was 100% financed through Deutsche Bank and the Fortress 
Group.  Deutsche Bank would later sell some of these buildings, recouped though foreclosure, 
for $818 per square foot, or almost 26% less than Macklowe’s purchase less than 18 months 
prior.       
 
In summer of 2007 the subprime mortgage crisis irrevocably changed the financing landscape 
for commercial real estate.  Even though the roots of the crisis were in residential real estate 
lending practices, the ubiquity of the exposure across most classes of investors was surprising, 
most of all to investors who were unaware of any such exposure.  As described by David 
Leonhardt in the New York Times, “The American home seemed like such a sure bet that a 
huge portion of the global financial system ended up owning a piece of it.”10    However most 
were unaware of the underlying risk of their investments.  The secondary market had become 
so complicated that investors relied almost exclusively on the rating agencies’ evaluation of 
risk.  When massive losses exposed the enormous flaws in relying upon these agencies, the 
market immediately looked to the CMBS market that functioned under much of the same 
investment principles. Investors lost complete confidence in the secondary market and liquidity 
literally vanished almost overnight.  The CMBS market, which had provided $605 Billion in 
commercial real estate financing in the three years prior to 2008, seized.  Total CMBS market 
activity plummeted to $12 billion in total issuance in 2008 with no activity at all in the second 
half of the year (see figure 4).   
                                                 
7 Source:  CMBS World, Summer 2007 
8 Source: NAREIT  
9 Source: Sam Zell’s Empire, Underwater in a Big Way: NYTimes February 7, 2009 
10 Source: Can’t Grasp Credit Crisis? Join the Club: NYTimes March 19, 2008 
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As noted, the valuation of the New York City portfolio formerly owned by EOP and later 
acquired by Macklowe had lost almost 26% of its value in 18 months.  To state that Macklowe 
dramatically miscalculated value oversimplifies the issue. In fact, it can be demonstrated that 
the change in the lending climate alone can be held responsible for a great deal of the 
revaluation and with it a corresponding change in market capitalization rates.   
 
Impact of Leverage 
 
This demonstration was initially presented in a 2009 CMBS market forecast prepared by 
Merrill Lynch (See Figure 5).  An investor who requires a 10% return on equity (ROE) is 
presented with the opportunity to purchase a property with an NOI of $6.6 million.  The 
financing market is prepared to provide an 80% LTV interest-only loan at the rate of 5.75%.  
Given this available financing, the resulting cash flow after debt service would equate to a 10% 
return on the initial investment equity of $20 million and the investor would be prepared to 
purchase the property for $100 million equating to a 6.6% cap rate.  This fairly simple example 
is surprising accurate in representing the commercial real estate market dynamics from 2005 - 
2007.    
 
Transfer this example with the same property and the same investor return requirements to 
2009 and the effects of the change in the lending markets upon property valuation are evident.  
The assumption for the financing available in today’s market is 60% LTV payable at 7.25% 
 
Figure 4 – Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert 
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interest and amortizing on a 30-year schedule. Given the financing now available and the 
resulting cash flow after debt service that would equate to a 10% return on investment, the 
investor is no longer able to purchase the property at any price greater than $74 million. With 
no change other than the financing terms available to the investor, the property has lost 26% of 
its value and the market capitalization rate has increased 230 basis points.  
 
  
 
Anecdotally, the market consensus among CRE professionals is that property values have 
fallen 20-30% and cap rates have increased approximately 200 basis points, generally 
consistent with what is suggested in figure 5.  However, the same market participants will also 
concede that for most properties, NOI is decreasing in the current economic climate and that 
investors’ required rates of return have increased given the relative scarcity of investment 
capital available.  If this is indeed the case, then the previous example suggests that the impact 
on value should be even greater. 
 
Property Value Declines 
 
The fact that property values may have declined more than 30% is exactly the fear in today’s 
market climate. With relatively limited financing, there have been very few trades and as a 
result it has been difficult to assess current market values. The lending community is 
particularly fearful.  Looking once more to the example in figure 5, except this time from the 
perspective of the lender, and the prospect of significant principal loss on the part of banks and 
lending institutions becomes increasingly likely.   
 
The lack of affordable, or in some cases any, debt financing is the most significant obstacle 
currently facing the CRE market.  Estimates are that approximately 40% of the $3.4 trillion in 
commercial mortgages outstanding will reach maturity over the four-year period ending in 
2012.11  During that time, the relative average outstanding loan-to-value ratio of these loans 
may approach 100% LTV (figure 6).  One of the larger issues is that the loans originated after 
2005 were provided to investors at extraordinarily low interest rates and with minimal loan 
covenants.   The underlying assets may be expected to generate enough income necessary to 
cover debt service and avoid default, but lenders are unable to take any action to protect their 
loan positions even though the prospects of full repayment at maturity are increasingly 
                                                 
11 Source: PPR  
 
Figure 5 – Source: Merrill Lynch  
The Impact of Leverage on Value 
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unlikely.  In many instances, these loans will hobble toward default at maturity.  Many of the 
riskiest loans from 2005-2007 were five-year interest-only loans.12 This provides for a large 
segment of the most problematic loans to mature after 2010 and the possibility of a more 
protracted and distressing resolution. It also raises the risk that many more bank failures may 
be inevitable.   
 
Projected CMBS Loan-To-Value by Maturity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
National Problems 
 
What lies next for the CRE market is uncertain.  The severity of the current crisis for the 
commercial real estate market appears highly dependent upon the economy. CRE 
fundamentals are weak across almost every property category and comparisons are being made 
to the 1990s in an effort to estimate the extent of the market devaluation.  Deutsche Bank 
recently published its commercial real estate outlook for Q1 2009 in which it estimates that 
property price declines of up to 35-40% can be expected. That would not only exceed the 
declines experienced in the early 1990s, but also push prices to those levels of early 2004.  
However, where the downturn in the 1990s was the result of over-building and excess supply, 
the current crisis is one of reduced demand.  Rent declines and vacancy rates may approach 
those of the early 1990s even without the overhang of new inventories, and delinquencies could 
reach the peak rate of 6-7% experience during that era by 2010. 13   
 
What is certain, however, is that the CRE market will go through a painful but necessary 
process of delevering over the next several years.  Unfortunately, the combination of deter-
iorating property fundamentals, and the resulting impact on cash flow and value, with more 
stringent market underwriting standards, increases the likelihood that a high percentage of the 
loans originated from 2005 – 2007 will not qualify for refinancing.  In fact, assuming that the 
lending market has returned on a more permanent basis to conservative underwriting 
                                                 
12 Source: Deutsche Bank 
13 Ibid 
Figure 6 – Source: Trepp 
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standards (LTV <70%) it is anticipated that approximately two-thirds of loans maturing 
through 2012 would not qualify for refinancing.  14 
 
With greater than $300 billion in CRE loans maturing annually through 2012, it was originally 
perceived that these loan maturities would fuel forced sales activity.  Without question, there 
will be opportunities for those adequately capitalized to purchase defaulted loans or assets 
from fallen banks.  However, with bank balance sheets precariously weak, many in the lending 
community are unwilling to book losses or post the increase in reserve requirements associated 
with foreclosure activity. With the vast majority of loans covering debt service, and banks either 
unwilling or unable to foreclose, it appears increasingly likely that the market may address the 
issue in the short term through extending loan maturities. Without additional intervention, 
however, it doesn’t seem that time alone would be adequate to provide the asset appreciation 
required to eventually qualify for refinancing.   
 
Portland Prospects 
 
The failure of Pinnacle Bank in February, the first Oregon Bank to close since 1992, is 
indicative that the local market will also have its share of challenges.   However, the outlook for 
Portland’s commercial real estate market may not be as bleak as other areas of the country.  It 
is not necessarily a result of regional market strength, but rather a combination of extenuating 
circumstances that may temper the local fallout.     
 
Shorenstein Properties’ Portland portfolio is certainly not nearly worth the $300 per square foot 
transaction price today.  However, Shorenstein’s owner profile has traditionally been that of a 
durable investor utilizing modest leverage over a long-term investment horizon.   There is little 
probability that the 45 buildings purchased, including the 369,000 square foot Congress 
Center and the 271,600 square foot Umpqua Bank Plaza will be dumped on the market in the 
type of distressed sale that may be seen in other localities.  In addition, Portland came under 
the focus of out-of-market investors very late in the cycle.  As a result, the market continues to 
be dominated by local investors and primary lenders generally attracted to the traditional 
attributes of the slow-growth, high barrier to entry Portland market.    
 
This is not to suggest that Portland will not face significant challenges or declines in value.   
The prospects of even higher unemployment, higher vacancies, decreased traffic at the Port of 
Portland and the pressures of significant additions to the Portland office inventory will certainly 
be a drag on values.  However, Portland did not see the extended wave of yield-chasing, high 
leverage, short-term investors that will feed distressed sales.   
 
Seattle Scenario 
 
Unfortunately, the same may not be said for Seattle, and it is likely that this credit crisis will 
impact that metropolitan area particularly hard.  During the last cycle, Seattle emerged as a 
viable institutional investor market.  The region had been previously bypassed as a market 
with few institutional quality assets, and a cyclical economy closely linked to the fortunes of 
Boeing.  However the proliferation of a more diversified economic base generated strong outside 
demand.  It was also one of the last markets to exhibit weakness, which many pointed to as 
proof of the strength of underlying investment fundamentals.  Unfortunately, much of that 
optimism vanished with the collapse of Washington Mutual in February 2008 and, while 
Seattle burned hotter and longer than many markets, it may also fall harder.   
 
Seattle is also one of the markets that is currently exhibiting some distressed sales activity.  
Some of the institutions which made market-entry decisions during the last cycle are now 
                                                 
14 Ibid 
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retrenching to their core markets at the expense of the Puget Sound region.   The prospective 
sale of the recently listed Seattle Tower in downtown Seattle is being closely watched as an 
indication of market valuations.  The property sold in 2004 to Trinity Real Estate for $19.2 
million, or roughly $120 per square foot.15  In 2006, the property was purchased for $36 
million, or approximately $227 per square foot.16  Now back on the market, speculation 
remains that value may revert very close to 2004 levels and could very well define the level of 
risk and returns that are required of commercial real estate investors in today’s economic 
climate.   
 
Federal Intervention 
 
The government is highly motivated to prevent the damage to banks, insurance companies and 
other financial institutions that would be caused in the downward spiral of commercial real 
estate values brought on by the mass sale of distressed assets or foreclosed properties.  In 
exactly what form or fashion the government will intervene is unclear, although it can be 
anticipated that the government will participate, and likely aggressively, to prevent market 
deterioration beyond what is necessary. In any event, the credit crisis and its resulting impacts 
are the defining events of the CRE landscape and will define the industry for at least the next 
half decade as the S&L crisis defined the markets of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Source: Puget Sound Business Journal, December 3, 2004.  
16 Source: Cushman & Wakefield, Marketbeat Snapshot, Third Quarter 2006.   
Heinicke •  Bursting Bubbles • Portland’s Distressed Housing Market 
 
 
 
PSU Center for Real Estate •  Quarterly & Urban Development Journal • 2nd Quarter 2009 •  Page 35 
Bursting Bubbles: 
Portland’s Distressed Housing Market 
 
Tom Heinicke, Broker, Meadows Group, Inc. 1 
 
As of mid 2008, essentially all leading home price indexes had been confirming declines for all 
major U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), bringing to an end what economists consider 
the greatest asset bubble in history2. Throughout the nation, these housing bubbles have 
varied in intensity. Home values almost tripled in a span of a couple of years in places such as 
Miami or Las Vegas. In Portland, by contrast, price movements reflected a more moderate 
trajectory, nonetheless producing gains in excess of 90% between 2000 and late 20073.  
 
Apart from intensity, Portland’s housing bubble also differed markedly with respect to timing. 
San Diego and Los Angeles, for instance had maintained consistently high appreciation rates 
since the late 1990s, whereas the Las Vegas and Phoenix bubbles did not develop until 2003 
and 2004 respectively. Portland was even later yet, experiencing its highest appreciation in 
2005 and parts of 2006. 
 
Home Price Appreciation Index for Selected Metropolitan Areas (S&P/Case-Shiller) 
By mid-to-late 2006, at a time when the Portland housing market was in full swing, the bubble 
had popped in many parts of the country. Portland had been late to the party and would be 
among the last to leave. Eventually as much as 18 months after the first hot markets had 
begun to cool down, Portland started showing signs of weariness. 
                                                 
1 www.agent503.com 
2 Irrational Exuberance, 2nd edition AND “In come the waves”, Economist, June 16, 2005 
3 S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices 
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Planned Communities, Suburban Developments Take the First Blow 
 
During the boom years, Portland's urban growth boundary (UGB) served as a means to protect 
the city against the perils of endless sprawl. The limited space available to developers within 
the city limits helped to contain the supply of housing inventory and avoid the deep pain found 
in fast-growing cities in the nation’s southwest.  
Nonetheless, recent nearby incorp-
orations and additions to the UGB, 
such as 800 acres of land on the 
north side of NW Springville Road in 
2002, created potentially lucrative 
opportunities for developers of 
master-planned communities. As a 
result, a record 16,786 building 
permits were issued in 2005, followed 
by another 15,325 in 2006.4 
In the wake of ever tighter credit 
markets and an increasingly dismal 
economic outlook, demand then 
began to dry up, leaving behind large 
numbers of desperate sellers and 
dozens of nearly vacant subdivisions.  
Happy Valley’s Francesca Lane, in Clackamas County embodied this trend like few other 
developments in the Portland metropolitan area and soon became the Oregonian’s poster child 
for developer greed, lofty housing dreams and the inevitable harsh landing5.  
 
“In 2006 young families 
rol led in to snap up 
$600,000, stone-fronted 
homes with Mount Hood 
views. They came for the 
country meets cul-de-sac 
life, solid schools and a 
4,000-square-foot edition 
of the American dream. 
Speculators trailed on 
their heels for the next 
get-rich-quick venture.  
One of every five homes 
or lots on the street has 
fallen into foreclosure 
since the neighborhood 
sprang up three years 
ago. The street offers a 
grim picture of how greed 
dragged Happy Valley, Oregon, and even the world, into financial turmoil. Francesca Lane is 
where the country's gamble on high-risk mortgages inflated home values, then crashed down on 
the freshly manicured lawns”6 
                                                 
4 Number of Building Permits; Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA; Total, 2005;2006 
5 Road to ruin: Happy Valley street embodies national housing bust, Oregonian, Dec 06, 2008 
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Source: First American Loan Performance 
% 
 
Source: Oregonian 
 
 
1. Buena Vista Custom Homes lot in 
foreclosure lawsuit 
2. Ditto 
3. Investment home with no-down payment 
loan, interest-only option and $5,000 
monthly payment; purchased for 
$633,000, re-sold for $515,000 
4. Subprime, no-down loan, two-year 
adjustable rate and interest only option, 
resold for $450,000 
5. No-down loan, five-year adjustable rate, 
resold for $450,000 
6. Home bought for 638K on no-down loan. 
Then filed for bankruptcy and reported 
$35,477 in wages. Resold for $470,000 
7. Subprime, no-down loan. Resold: 
$477,000 
8. Subprime loan, 11.75% interest, $6,390 
monthly payments. Resold: $435,000 
9. Developer deeded home to bank in-lieu of 
foreclosure 
10. Ditto.7 
 
With more than 675 empty lots and 35 half-finished homes exposed to the weather, price 
points soon started to tumble, affecting nearby neighborhoods and eventually leading to one of 
the highest numbers of foreclosures for any county in the state or Oregon8. The Center for 
Responsible Lending, a North Carolina nonprofit, estimates 50,000 Clackamas County homes 
will lose an average of $3,200 in value because of neighboring foreclosures.  
Subprime-Related Defaults Usher In Initial Wave of Suburban Distress 
 
Spillover effects from neighboring subdiv-
isions contributed to a rising number of 
distressed property situations throughout the 
Portland-metro area. However, the bulk of short 
sales and foreclosures that surfaced in the early 
stages of the downturn i.e. onwards from 
Q3/2007, were the result of sub-prime9 
lending practices, particularly prevalent 
among low-income, high risk borrowers.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
8 Clackamas Co. among highest foreclosure rates in Oregon, MSNBC, Mar 19, 2009 
9 According to the U.S. Dept. of Treasury guideline: "Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit 
histories that include payment delinquencies and possibly more severe problems such as charge-offs, 
judgments, and bankruptcies. They may also display reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit 
scores, debt-to-income ratios, or other criteria that may encompass borrowers with incomplete credit 
histories." 
Share of Delinquent Mortgages Nationwide 
Heinicke •  Bursting Bubbles • Portland’s Distressed Housing Market 
 
 
 
PSU Center for Real Estate •  Quarterly & Urban Development Journal • 2nd Quarter 2009 •  Page 38 
Having largely been priced out of property markets in the urban core, a high-risk demographic 
group has typically sought more affordable alternatives on the outskirts of Portland, as 
indicated below. 
 
Map of Median Household Income for Portland-Metro Areas – Year 2000 
(Subprime-Related Default Hotspots Outlined in Red) 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
Therefore, on Portland’s eastside a large proportion of the initial wave of defaults has been 
concentrated in areas bordering the I-205 corridor as well as North and NE Portland. 
 
Average # of Notice Of Default Filings Per Week For Eastside Zip Codes, Q4/2007 
 
Source: First American Title Co. 
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The vast majority of these homes had a market value that was significantly lower than the 
median sales price ($285,000) for the Portland-metro area at the time10. In fact, at the median 
price sold for both bank-owned and short sales in Q4/2007 for zip codes 97206, 97236 and 
97266 was roughly $100,000 less than the median for the city at large. 
Profile of Eastside Homes In Subprime Distress (Zip Codes: 97206, 97236, 97266) 
 
Average Sold Price Of Short Sales: $ 195,497 
Median Sold Price Of Short Sales: $ 173,250 
Average Sold Price Of Bank-Owned: $ 188,338 
Median Sold Price Of Bank-Owned: $ 169,205  
Average Sq. Ft: 1,720 
 
Median Sq. Ft: 
 
 
Source: RMLS, Q4/2007 
 
1,532 
 
 
Gradually, Distress Turns Endemic 
Initially a suburban phenomenon, distress soon spread throughout the Portland metropolitan 
area accelerating as more and more delinquent borrowers were added to the statistics.  
Share of Delinquent Loans 
Increases by 70%, Year-over-Year 
 Share of Delinquent Loans, Fourth 
Quarter (Oregon vs. U.S. Average) 
Ranked among the top five states for 
loan performance as recently as 
Q4/2007, Oregon appeared to 
remain largely unscathed by the 
housing downturn. By the fourth 
quarter of 2008, however, the share 
of delinquent loans had reached 5%, 
up more than 70%. 
Mortgage delinquencies for the 
nation as a whole are reported at 7%, 
influenced to a large extent by 
foreclosure hot spots such as Cal-
ifornia, Florida and Nevada. Oregon 
mortgage troubles have yet to reach 
levels seen during the 1980s timber 
recession, but delinquencies clearly 
exceed the fallout from the dot.com 
bust.11 
 
  
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
                                                 
10 Median Sales Price for Q4/2007, RMLS 
6.2% 
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Loans that have been delinquent for more than 90 days are typically subject to a notice of 
trustee sale and typically scheduled for foreclosure proceedings. This process is referred to as 
“foreclosure starts”. Tracking foreclosure starts provides additional insight into housing 
distress. 
Foreclosure Starts Increase 111% 
From the Same Time Last Year 
 N u m b e r  o f  F o r e c l o s u r e  S t a r t s    
Fourth Quarter (Oregon) 
 
Roughly 5,000 foreclosure starts were 
recorded for Q4/2008 – more than 
twice as many as in Q4/2007. On 
average, 55 foreclosure starts were filed 
each day in the last quarter of 2008 up 
from 26 per day one year earlier. 
Assuming a linear trend over the next 
couple of months, foreclosure starts will 
have increased threefold by the mid 
2009 over late 2003. 
 
                    
  Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
Oregon’s housing distress phenomenon also appears to have closed the gap with many other 
States. According to RealtyTrac, an online marketplace for foreclosures, the number of 
properties in Oregon with at least one foreclosure filing (default, auction, repossession) has 
risen steadily, placing Oregon among some of the most distressed states in the country by 
some measures. 
Oregon Among Top 5 States For 
Foreclosure Filings 
 Number of Foreclosure Filings       
(1/every HH rate), January 2009 
A recent RealtyTrac report showed 
Oregon among the top five states 
with the most foreclosure filings on 
a per household basis for the month 
of January. One in every 357 homes 
in Oregon received a foreclosure 
filing, with less densely populated 
counties such as Deschutes, 
Jackson and Clackamas at higher 
levels.12 Oregon’s February rating 
improved slightly putting Oregon in 
9th place. 
 
1. Nevada (1 in every 76) 
2. California ( 1 in every 173) 
3. Arizona (1 in every 182) 
4. Florida (1 in every 214) 
5. Oregon (1 in every 357) 
24. Washington (1 in every 874) 
  Source: RealtyTrac 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 MBA National Delinquency Survey, 4th Quarter 2008, Mortgage Bankers Association 
12 The 1/every HH approach is skewed by counties with a large number of foreclosures, but low 
population density 
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Alarming Delinquency 
Trend Similar Across 
Tri-County Area 
  Number of Notices of Default Filed Per Month By County 
 
Multnomah County, the 
most populous among the 
three largest Oregon 
counties, dominates delin-
quency filings. In January 
2009, roughly 730 Notices 
of Default were recorded, 
up 175% from one year 
ago. Delinquency filings 
were up threefold for 
Washington County, Reg-
istering 431 filings for the 
month of January and 
surpassing Clackamas 
County, where delinq-
uency grew 118%. 
 
 
 
Source: First American Title Co. 
Not every delinquent homeowner suffers foreclosure. As a result, the actual number of 
foreclosed properties will differ considerably from delinquency rates for a given area. In spite of 
the fact that trustee/foreclosure sales are open to the public, most foreclosed properties in 
Oregon currently revert back to the bank. Market inventory for distressed properties typically 
also consists of short sales13. 
Largest Inventory of Bank-Owned 
Short Sales - Multnomah County 
 Number of Bank-Owned and Short Sale 
Properties Listed For Sale-Mar 26, 2009 
Within the tri-county area, Mult-
nomah County currently offers the 
largest inventory of bank-owned and 
short sale properties. More than 700 
short sales and 250 bank-owned 
properties are available to buyers in 
Portland’s most populous county. 
Washington County trails Mult-
nomah by some 100 bank-owned 
properties and reports roughly 100 
fewer short sales. Short sales are 
least common in Clackamas county.  
 
 
Source: RMLS 
 
                                                 
13 A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the proceeds from the sale fall short of the balance owed on 
the loan. 
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Distress Likely Spurred by Delinquencies on Alt-A Mortgages 
It would appear that a significant proportion of the most recent rise in housing distress 
throughout the Portland metropolitan area can be attributed to a phenomenon that is 
accelerating nationwide. Homeowners with good credit are falling behind on their payments in 
growing numbers, even as the problems with mortgages made to people with weak, or 
subprime, credit are showing their first, tentative signs of leveling off.14 Of particular concern 
are so-called “Alt-A” mortgages, offered to borrowers in the segment between subprime and 
prime. This market was created as a means of extending home ownership to those, such as the 
self-employed, with a reasonable credit standing but unsteady income. Alt-A lenders 
specialized in loans with limited documentation requirements and exotic features such as 
negative-amortization mortgages, akin to a credit card, which allow borrowers to pay less than 
the accrued interest, with the difference added to the loan balance.  
 
Negative-amortization and interest-only mortgages seemed appealing to many borrowers while 
home prices were still rising and homes could be sold prior to payments on principal being 
required. After spending several years paying only interest or sometimes even less than that, 
many Alt-A borrowers are now seeing their payments jump 50 % or more. The higher bills come 
as home prices continue to decline and banks tighten their lending standards, making it 
harder for people to refinance loans or sell their homes ultimately forcing homeowners into 
negative equity, under-water positions and pushing up the number of defaults. 
Alt-A borrowers typically had a five- or seven-year 
grace period before payments toward principal were 
required. By contrast, subprime loans had a two-to-
three-year introductory period. That difference partly 
explains the lag in delinquencies between the two 
types of loans. Alt-A troubles first made headlines 
last summer, when IndyMac, the seventh largest 
mortgage originator in the nation, had to be seized 
by the FDIC as a result of its over-leveraged Alt-A 
operations.15 The speed at which Alt-A mortgages 
have since soured has taken many by surprise.  
Moody’s, which had issued a relatively optimistic 
outlook for Alt-A loans in mid-2008, recently 
quadrupled its loss projections on bonds backed by 
such loans. Of the $59 billion of AAA-rated securities on which Moody’s cut ratings in late 
January, an overwhelming 91% were subsequently downgraded to junk bond status. Moody’s 
now expects losses for 2006-07 Alt-A securitizations to top 20%, compared with an historical 
average of well under 1%. The volume of Alt-A debt nationwide is substantial. Currently an 
estimated $1.3 trillion of total Alt-A debt exists, including both securitized and unsecuritized 
loans. According to some sources losses could exceed $600 billion, almost as much as expected 
subprime losses.16  
An estimated 26,000 Portland-area homeowners currently hold an Alt-A mortgage. Portland 
residents, facing relatively high-priced homes but not-so-high incomes, resorted to Alt-A 
mortgages more frequently than residents of most other American cities, while using fewer 
subprime loans.17 Much of the recent data would seem to support that Alt-A and prime 
delinquencies are indeed a serious and growing problem for Portland and beyond. 
                                                 
14 Housing Lenders Fear Bigger Wave of Loan Defaults, New York Times, Aug 8, 2008 
15 IndyMac Bank seized by federal regulators, LA Times, July 12, 2008 
16 Move Over, Subprime, Economist, Feb 5, 2009 
17 Shaky loans may spur new foreclosure wave, Portland Tribune, Mar 6, 2009 
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Prime Foreclosure Starts are 
Growing Three Times Faster than 
Subprime 
 Number of Prime vs. Subprime Foreclosure 
Starts, Fourth Quarter, Oregon 
Prime foreclosure starts in Q4/2008 
increased by 182% compared to 
Q4/2007 ,  ou tpac ing  subpr ime  
foreclosure starts in terms of growth as 
well as volume. Overall, subprime 
loans continue to have higher rates of 
problems than prime loans, as a 
percentage of loans serviced in the 
respective category, but the rate of 
increase in prime problem loans is 
much higher than for subprime loans.  
Subprime loans account for 9% of all 
loans but 40+% of problem loans. 
However, prime loan problem loans 
grew by 180% to 240% in several 
problem loan categories. 
 
 
  Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
Mortgage Resets Likely to 
Trigger Additional Defaults 
 Monthly Mortgage Rate Resets (U.S.)            
In Billions of Dollars 
 
Beyond Alt-A and prime mortgages, 
resets on Option Adjustable Rate 
Mortgages (Option ARMs) are 
expected to pose an additional 
problem for borrowers and lenders 
alike. The majority of subprime 
resets has already occurred, result-
ing in fewer problems than 
anticipated since many borrowers 
have been able to refinance at 
historically low interest rates.  
 
However, as the first wave of 
Option ARM resets approaches, 
home prices will have declined even 
further, reducing the share of 
homeowners that are likely to 
qualify to refinance. The situation 
is considered especially precarious 
given the widespread use of 
negative amortization among 
Option ARMs and could be further 
exacerbated by rising interest rates. 
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Higher-End Homes Increasingly Affected By Mortgage Crisis 
As distressed housing works its way up the food chain, the crisis is spreading from lower-
priced neighborhoods to well-heeled parts of town. From high-end downtown condos to 4,000 
square foot close-in mansions, distressed properties have become increasingly common. 
 
 
Delinquency No Longer An Entry-
Level Phenomenon 
In the Pearl District, borrowers are late 
on their payments at such high-end 
condominiums as the Henry or the 
Waterfront Pearl, where luxury lofts 
until recently have been selling at a 
minimum of $500 per square foot. 
Delinquency has become a regular 
feature at several South Waterfront 
developments, notably the John Ross. 
 
 
Recent Notice Of Default Filings For Multnomah County  
Location  Purchase Price Mortgage Amount Default Amount 
Henry Lofts (Condo) $ 490, 000 $ 343,000 $ 10,565 
Pinnacle (Condo) $ 817,500 $ 613,100 $ 24,105 
Belmont/Hawthorne (SFH) $ 760,000 $ 608,000 $ 37,337 
Forest Heights (SFH) $ 1,100,000 $ 715,000 $ 30,382 
Alameda (SFH) $ 875,000 $1,000,000 $ 45,293 
  Source: First American Title Co. 
 
High-End Distressed Properties 
Have Been Selling At Significant 
Discounts 
Roughly 50 distressed condos are 
currently on the market in downtown 
Portland. More than half of the re-
sale inventory at the Shoreline 
townhouses in the Pearl District is 
bank-owned. Half a dozen ridge-top 
mansions in Forest Heights have 
been substantially discounted since 
banks took them back. Some of the 
most competitively priced inventory 
in the Portland-metro area is either a   
short sale or bank-owned, placing considerable pressure on conventional sales in recent 
months. In an effort to move large-ticket inventory off their balance sheets, banks have begun 
to show more flexibility when negotiating with cash buyers.  
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Recent Sales Of Distressed Property In Multnomah County  
Location  Sale Price Sale Date Previous Sale Price 
Previous 
Sale Date % Decline 
Pearl District $ 420,000 Mar, 2009   $ 755,000 Jun, 2006 44% 
Sullivan’s Gulch $ 475,000 Mar, 2009   $ 549,000 Jul, 2005 13% 
West Linn $ 382,000 Mar, 2009    $ 541,000 Sept, 2006 29% 
Downtown $ 700,000 Oct, 2008 $ 1,115,000 Dec, 2006 37% 
Forest Heights $ 800,000 Dec, 2008 $ 1,220,000 July, 2006 34% 
    Source: RMLS  
 
Liquidation Sales, Auctions and Incentive Programs Sought To Unload Inventory 
 
Liquidation sales and auctions have been a staple method to unload surplus inventory among 
developers faced with the prospect of bankruptcy since the early days of the housing market 
downturn.  
 
Buena Vista Custom Homes conducted a well-publicized December 2007 auction that resulted 
in 141 homes being sold generating over $65 million in sales18. The December sale is believed 
to be the largest two-day sale of real estate by one seller in Oregon history. In early 2008, 
another auction followed with 52 homes from nine of Buena Vista's neighborhoods and 18 
buildable lots from three different developments in the Portland metropolitan area. Buyers at 
the December auction, in particular, were able to purchase homes at significant discounts: 
 
• In Beaverton's Carson Crest neighborhood, a home previously listed at $624,950 was 
sold at auction for $475,000, discounted 24 percent. 
 
• In Sandy, a home in Buena Vista's Hamilton Ridge development sold for $241,500 after 
being previously listed at $321,950, discounted 25 percent. 
 
 
 
Pacific Lifestyle Homes and Legend Homes, two of four 
local home builders to file for reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 2008, had 
formed a joint marketing venture to sell more than 100 
completed homes in the Willamette Valley by the end of 
March.19 List prices ranged between $174,000 and 
$599,999. The event has been a considerable success, 
clearing out more than 40% of the available inventory. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Oregon Home Builder Announces Second Home Auction, Reuters, Feb 08, 2008 
19 Bankrupt home builders form marketing venture…, Portland Business Journal, Jan 22, 2009  
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Recent Sales at New Home Liquidation Sale 
Location Original Price Sale Price20 Discount % 
Hillsboro $ 269,900 $ 209,900 22% 
Happy Valley $ 425,200 $ 368,900 13% 
Wilsonville $ 536,962 $ 469,900 13% 
Tigard $ 412,833 $ 354,900 14% 
Wilsonville $ 436,818 $ 387,900 12% 
Source: RMLS, Pacific Lifestyle Homes, Legend Homes 
 
 
 
Community Financial Corp., a subsidiary of Banner Bank, recently 
launched “The Great Northwest Home Rush”, a program that is 
intended to boost sales for builders who owe the bank millions of 
dollars, by offering mortgages to new homebuyers at less than four 
percent interest. Loans are available only for properties purchased 
from a list of roughly 300 homes and lots in the Portland-metro area 
developed by numerous builders indebted to Banner Bank. 
 
Although Banner Bank never engaged in subprime lending, it did 
provide construction and land loans to dozens of builders during the 
boom. The bank's publicly traded parent company, Banner Corp., 
recently reported that it had about $150 million in bad residential 
construction loans and related lot and land loans on the books at the 
end of 2008. The program officially ended on Mar 22, 2009 after some 
30 homes sold, generating at least $ 50,000 million in loans for Banner. 21 
The Real Estate Disposition Company (REDC), one of the nation’s largest residential real estate 
auction marketing companies, held its largest auction to date in the Portland-metro area in 
April. Despite attendance of over 1,000 people, bids were accepted for only 35 of 50 properties, 
subject to seller confirmation. Auction inventory included a wide range of properties from 
beach homes in Tillamook County to condominiums in the Pearl District and custom homes in 
upscale neighborhoods.  
3,000 Square Foot Forrest Heights Home Among 50+ Properties at Auction 
 
Source: REDC 
                                                 
20 Sale pending. Final price and additional incentives not confirmed 
21 Bank offers home loans below 4%, Inman News, Mar 17, 2009 
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Outlook: Rapid Recovery Unlikely 
 
Much of outlook for the Portland real estate market will depend on how unemployment is 
affected by the economic downturn in the months ahead. Recent trends have not been very 
encouraging. So far, lay-off announcements by Oregon’s most prominent and significant 
employers have been fairly moderate.  
• OHSU, Portland largest employer with 12,700 staff, suffered substantial investment 
losses in 2008 and now needs to reduce expenses by about $30 million, approximately 
4 percent of payroll22.   
• In February, Nike, the state’s largest publicly traded company announced that it 
intends to cut its workforce by 4% as part of restructuring efforts23.  
• Portland’s PCC Structurals, Inc., a division of Precision Castparts Corp., the second-
largest publicly traded company based in Oregon, will cut 10 percent of its salaried 
workers24.  
Nonetheless Oregon’s downward employment trend is well underway. According to Oregon 
Employment Department officials, the state lost 81,800 jobs in the past 12 months, far 
exceeding the 64,500 jobs lost between 2001 and 2003 during the previous recession25. The 
number of unemployed Oregonians jumped to 236,286 in February, more than doubling over 
the past 12 months. The state's total nonfarm payroll employment fell to 1,636,400. Experts 
were particularly concerned by February numbers which revealed a one-month loss of 21,700 
jobs, seasonally adjusted, the largest since the state began keeping records in 1977. On 
average, 775 jobs Oregon were lost each day in February.  
 
Oregon Loses 21,7000 Jobs in February, Now #3 In The Nation For Unemployment 
 
Source: Oregonian 
As a result of February’s steep drop, unemployment in Oregon jumped a full percentage point - 
up from January's rate of 9.8 percent. According to David Cooke, a state labor economist, 
                                                 
22 OHSU freezes salaries, plans layoffs, Oregonian, Dec 01, 2008 
23 Nike may cut workforce by up to 4% as part of restructuring; MarketWatch, Feb 10, 2009 
24 Precision Castparts plans 10% layoffs, DJC, Jan 13, 2009 
25 Oregon jobless rate hits 10.8%, Oregonian, Mar 16, 2009 
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Oregon hasn't had 10.8 percent unemployment since July 1983. By the end of March, Oregon’s 
unemployment reached 12.1%. Oregon now has the second-highest unemployment rate in the 
country, behind only Michigan at 12.6%. 
The administration’s Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan is expected to bring some 
temporary relief for housing markets as banks suspend foreclosures, while some debt 
situations are worked out with delinquent borrowers. However, considerable doubt remains as 
to how the plan will be perceived by lenders, the entities charged with implementing the plan. If 
billion-dollar bailout funds are not encouraging banks to increase lending, it remains 
questionable how much can be expected from yet another set of incentives, well intentioned 
though they might be.26 Action on behalf of lenders is furthermore impeded by the complexity 
of the plan with multiple programs, federal and state bureaucracies, conditions and caveats. 
The four-page White House executive summary is confusing to many. How well it may be 
digested by the average bank officer or low-income subprime borrower is open to question. 
Assuming distressed property inventory does indeed level-off, Multnomah County would still 
face at least another 10-12 months to clear out its share of distressed property, based on the 
current rate of sales for this category27. That’s assuming demand continues at current levels, in 
spite of a worsened economic outlook in recent months. It may be more likely that inventory 
will increase as banks are not inclined to suspend foreclosures indefinitely and many 
borrowers face increasing pressures to meet payments in a harsh economic climate. 
 
                                                 
26 Gov't: Bailed-Out Banks Still Not Lending,  USA Today, Mar 17, 2009 
27 Number of distressed property sales for the month of February 2009 divided by total amount of 
available distressed inventory for that month. Source: RMLS 
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Housing Market Analysis 
Elizabeth Warren, Certificate of Real Estate Development Graduate Student & 
Oregon Association of Realtors [OAR] Fellow 
 
 
 
 
 The close of the 1st quarter in 2009 marks the continuation of last year’s trend as 
housing prices across the nation continue to depreciate.  Median U.S. home values were down 
–15% annually in February, and -30% for the western part of the nation. According to 
February’s Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller index, home prices fell a record 18.5% in 2008, with 
the biggest downturns in Phoenix (34%), Las Vegas (33%), and Miami (28.8%).1  For Portland, 
the index valued a $100,000 home in 2000 at $158,500 for the end of 2008.  RealtyTrac’s 
January foreclosure report put Oregon at fifth in the nation for notices of default, auctions, and 
other forms of foreclosure action.1  In 2008, 12.2% of all transactions involved foreclosed real 
estate.2  The number of permits issued nationally was down 50% and reduced by 58% in 
Oregon.2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/Pages/MetroPrice 
                                                 
1 Portland Business Journal. “Home Prices Tumble by Record 18.5 Percent”. Tuesday, February 24, 2009 
2 Business Journal. “Zillow: Portland took a $23 billion real estate hit in 2008”. Tuesday, February 3, 
2009 
Median Home Values of Existing Detached Homes 
  U.S. West 
Portland 
Metro Area 
February 2008 Median Sales Price $     193,600 $     296,600 $    287,550 
February 2009 Median Sales Price $     164,600 $     207,700  $    256,950 
% Change in Median Sales Price -15.0% -30.0%  -11.0% 
% Change in Number of Sales February
2008-2009 -3.6% 30.6% -21.0% 
Source: National Association of Realtors (February 2009) and RMLS (February 2009) 
Median Sales Prices of Existing Single Family Homes By Metropolitan Area
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Portland3 
Portland was no exception to the national trend.  By the end of 2008, 18.9% of all home sales 
in Portland resulted in a loss to the seller, and 21.2% of all homeowners statistically owed more 
on their homes than they were worth.2  In March, buyers closed on 1,184 homes, dropping over 
-30% from a year ago. 4  The level of unsold homes in March decreased to a 12 month supply, 
well below the 16.6 month supply level of February, and the 19.2 month supply of January.  
Median prices for the first quarter were down –7.24% to $255,000 for the collective Portland 
market, resulting in a -13% annual depreciation.  Existing home sellers continue to mark down 
their prices, collecting an average of 90.05% of the original list price, with hopes that the three 
month wait on the market will decline as prices are lowered.  The number of transactions fell 
16% from last quarter, and 28% from the previous year.  An emphasis on the longer-term 
outlook of price per square foot puts the recent depreciation into perspective.  Portland’s 
existing single-family home values are still slightly above the median price per square foot 
values of the 2005 pre-bubble market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 First Quarter denotes aggregate data for January 1 – March 31, 2009.  Data compiled from RMLS [March 2009] 
4 Portland Business Journal. “RMLS: Home Sales Down in March”. Wednesday, April 15, 2009. 
              Building Permits Issued  
  Year to Date 
  SINGLE-FAMILY MULTIFAMILY 
  Feb09 Feb08 PCT CHG Feb09 Feb08 PCT CHG 
UNITED STATES 47.9  95.1  -50%   26.4    55.5  -53% 
OREGON 0.57  1.34  -58%   0.89    0.75  18% 
Bend OR 0.04  0.10  -61%        -    0.00  -100% 
Corvallis OR 0.01  0.00  125%        -         -  -  
Eugene-Springfield OR 0.04  0.11  -61%    0.01     0.08  -81% 
Medford OR 0.04  0.06  -37%    0.00         -  -  
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton OR-WA 0.31  0.78  -61%    0.23     0.59  -61% 
Salem OR    0.04     0.09  -58%    0.02     0.06  -63% 
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Median Sales Price & Number of Homes Sales per Quarter - Existing Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County) 
Sale Price/Original List Price & Average Days on Market – Existing Detached Homes 
           Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County)  
Median Sales Price & Number of Transactions – New Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County) 
8-Year outlook for Median Sales Price 
& Number of Transactions 
 
1st Quarter Median Price: $255,000 
Quarterly % Change: -7.24% 
Annual % Change: -26.35% 
 
Number of Transactions: 1,996 
Quarterly % Change: -16.10% 
Annual % Change: -28.56% 
2-Year Outlook for Average Days on 
Market & Sales Price/Original List Price 
Ratio 
  
1st Quarter Sale/Original ratio: 90.05 
Quarterly % Change: -0.60% 
Annual % Change: 0.55% 
 
Days on Market: 87 
Quarterly % Change: 14.47% 
Annual % Change: 20.83% 
8-Year Outlook for New Construction      
Single-Family Home Sales 
  
1st Quarter Median Price: $357,450 
Quarterly % Change: -0.68% 
Annual % Change: -5.31% 
 
Number of Transactions: 262 
Quarterly % Change: -30.87% 
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Broken down by sub-market, we can see where the single-family home activity took place in 
the 1st quarter. In the 4th quarter breakdown, Mt. Hood and Columbia County experienced over 
12% appreciation for single-family homes.5   
This quarter, the appreciation rates have moved toward Wilsonville and Yamhill County where 
home sales were up 16%.  An annual outlook puts all submarkets into the negative, with Lake 
Oswego again at the highest depreciation (-20.63%). However, a few markets encountered 
slightly less stark annual depreciation rates. The Tigard/Wilsonville and Mt. Hood markets 
depreciated –5% annually; Yamhill County values depreciated -6.5%.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Appreciation is based on the 17 home sales in Mt. Hood, and the 80 home sales in Columbia County 
Appreciation Rates of Existing Detached Homes - Portland Sub-Market
Q4 2008- Q1 2009
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Vancouver 
For Clark County, the story is similar to that in Portland.  In February, the Portland Business 
Journal reported that there were 225 total sales, down 23.5% from last year. Pending sales 
decreased 15.7%.2  The end of the first quarter showed that existing home prices for the 
downtown area of Vancouver dropped 5.75% from last quarter to $205,000. This marks a 13.1% 
annual decrease.  The number of downtown transactions fell -10% quarterly and -14% annually 
to 379.  The number of days on the market surpassed 100 for the first time in 5 years, with an 
average total of 105 days.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median Price and Annual Appreciation
Existing Detached Homes
 Vancouver
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In the suburbs of Clark County, the median price of existing detached homes hit $245,500 – 
up 2.29% from 4th quarter’s $240,000, but still -11.1% below last year’s values.  The number of 
transactions fell -9% quarterly, but enjoyed a small 2% upturn annually.  The average number 
of days on the market increased by about 9% quarterly and annually to 112 days.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median Price and Annual Appreciation
Existing Detached Homes
Clark County (excluding Vancouver)
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For the Vancouver and Clark County submarket, the first quarter followed Portland’s sub-
market.  Fourth quarter 2008 showed sales appreciating in Battleground, N. Felida, and 
Washougal.   
 
This quarter, appreciation rates are found in a handful of markets. However, none surpassed 
the 5% wall seen for the past few quarters.  Like Portland, annual median value rates for 
existing single-family homes for all markets were depreciating. East Heights and North Felida 
take the lead with –36% annual depreciation.  Cascade Park maintained an almost stationary 
position through the real estate turmoil of the past year, with only a slight depreciation of 0.3% 
in existing home sales.  The Lincoln/Hazel Dell market experienced a -3% annual depreciation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appreciation Rates of Existing Detached Homes 
Vancouver and Clark County Sub Market - Q4 2008 - Q1 2009
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Condominium and Attached Market6 
Condominium sales are significantly down from both the last quarter and the previous year 
numbers.  Across the metropolitan area, sales were down -36% from Portland's 4th quarter 
transactions, and -50% for Vancouver.  Decreases in the price per square foot were not as 
dramatic, but still confirmed that the 2008 bubble is still deflating.  For Portland, the price per 
square foot hit $192.96, with a median home value of $200,000.  The central city of 
Vancouver's price per square foot for condominiums fell -25% from last year. Sellers in the 
condominium market are receiving a median of $115.85/square foot and a median value of 
$123,950.  As seen in the graphs below, the Portland submarket follows a path which is similar 
to the larger central city areas.7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 RMLS defines attached as “an element of the residence construction is shared with another property.  Condominiums 
are excluded.  Condominiums are defined as an attached or stand-alone residence for which the owner has title to the 
space inside the unit and shares common spaces with other unit owners in accordance with specific legal guidelines. 
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For the single-family attached market, nearly all markets have fallen back to 2005 
price/square foot values. However, for Vancouver, attached home values match more closely to 
the price/square foot values of 2002 .  The longer time span outlook for the Portland market 
reveals substantial volatility, with the number of transactions down -27% quarterly and a 
slight 16% increase annually from 145 to 168.  Analysis of price per square foot appears less 
dramatic with -4% depreciation quarterly, and -7% annually to $138.58/square foot. The first 
quarter median home value was $220,250.  For central Vancouver, there were 19 total 
transactions, a decline of -24% from 4th quarter, and a dramatic -62% annually.   Attached 
home values were largely impacted by the current economic downturn, depreciating by -22% 
quarterly, and -28% annually.  Median prices fell to $150,000, with a $96.40/square foot 
value. 
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Central Oregon 
For the cities of Bend and Redmond, the first quarter median price and the number of 
transactions continued their slow decline while the average number of days on the market 
increased moderately.  In Bend, median single family home values fell -21% quarterly and        
-28% annually to $221,250.  The number of transactions was down –31%, and the average 
number of days on the market reached 191, a 3% increase from this time last year.  Redmond 
is similar, with the number of transactions down –17% annually, -33% quarterly, and median 
values falling –25% annually to $165,000.  Residents looking to sell experienced a –20% decline 
in the number of days on the market. Homes remained on the market for an average of 143 
days.  
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As it is commonly reported in Central Oregon, the housing stock is separated by lot size – 
properties under one acre and those between one and five acres.  Price per square foot is 
provided to control for lot size between both categories.  Here we see the continuing trend of 
declining prices after the peak in 2006. For Bend, this quarter marks the first time median 
home prices have fallen below 1st quarter 2005 values,  translating to a decline of -17% 
quarterly, -34% annual depreciation and a $347,500 median price for large lot homes.  Price 
per square foot followed suit, falling to a -27% annual depreciation of 167$/square foot.  The 
number of transactions was up 22% and the average days on the market fell –9%.  In 
Redmond, the first quarter was the second quarter in a row that median values for large lot 
homes fell below 2005 prices.  Although it was a 7% jump from last quarter, the $299,000 
median price marks a –15% annual depreciation for homeowners.  Redmond’s average price 
per square foot of $149/sq.ft revealed a -7% quarterly and a -28% annual depreciation.  The 
number of transactions remained steadily low at 11, while the number of days on the marked 
decreased dramatically from 264 to 195. 
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Willamette Valley 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The housing trends found in the northern parts of Oregon continue down the valley and into 
the southern counties.  Lane County has been hit the hardest by the housing crunch, with a    
-10.5% depreciation quarterly, and a -17.1% annual depreciation of existing homes.  However, 
with such a decline in prices, the average number of days a house remained on the market fell 
-21% from last year, and the number of transactions rose 212% to 278 transactions.  This 
could be due to sellers lowering their prices, and accepting 85% of their original list price to get 
the sale.  For the other four counties recording an annual depreciation, the number of days on 
the market rose dramatically and the number of transactions was far lower than the previous 
year. Linn County’s housing market is relatively strong.  Median home values are up 10% 
annually to $155,000 and the number of transactions rose 4.8%. However, in the longer term 
perspective, median values are still below 2007 prices, as are the number of days on the 
market (a 35% increase since 2007).  The county’s number of transactions is half what it was 
two years ago.   
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The Salem housing downturn continues.  Homeowners are waiting an average of four months 
before their homes sell, resulting in a -23% annual decline in the number of sales for the area.  
Median home values remain stable, falling less than one percent annually. As stressed in 
previous sections, a longer term outlook shows the median price of a single family home is still 
considerably higher than three years ago. 
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In the joint cities of Eugene/Springfield, median home values were down, the number of 
transactions fell, and the number of days on the market rose.  Homeowners are waiting three 
months to sell their homes, accepting a sale price averaging 88.8% under their original list 
price to get the property sold.  Median home values remained at the previous quarter’s price of 
$220,000, and the annual depreciation hovered around a relatively moderate -5%. 
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Apartment, Office Market Analysis 
April Chastain, RMLS Fellow & Certificate of Real Estate Development Student 
 
Portland Office Market 
 
 
 
Overall the office market has performed as anticipated this first quarter of 2009.  Overall 
vacancy is up, absorption is negative, sublease space has increased and most submarkets have 
seen a decrease in rents.  However, it seems that some companies are taking advantage of the 
downturn to move to more favorable locations.  The CBD is faring better than other areas, and 
actually saw an increase in asking rents.  Suburban vacancy rates are double those of the 
CBD.  While the CBD has experienced an increase in vacancy, the median vacancy rate is now 
equal to what it was in the first quarter of 2008, which is still lower than the first quarter of 
2009 by eight tenths of a percentage point.  CBD class A vacancy rates remain low at a 6.3% 
median rate and asking rents have actually increased $0.22 since last quarter, to $27.02 per 
square foot.  The suburban Class A median rent has decreased by $1.01 since last quarter, 
and the median vacancy rate has increased 1.2 percentage points since last quarter to 17.5%.   
 
Most are still positive about Portland’s ability to hold its own during the downtown. CB Richard 
Ellis points to the Forbes ranking of Portland 26th out of 200 largest metro areas, as a good 
place to do business.  They also mention that Element Power, a renewable energy company has 
decided to locate in Portland.  CBRE states that nearly 933,966 SF of office space is under 
construction, but makes a note that TMT Development plans to halt construction on Park 
Avenue West.  According to Norris, Beggs and Simpson, OHSU and Intel both laid off up to 
1,000 people this quarter, but Intel is still planning to invest $1.5 billion through 2010.  
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Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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OFFICE  Q1-09 
CB 
Richard 
Ellis 
Cushman & 
Wakefield 
Grubb & 
Ellis 
Norris, 
Beggs & 
Simpson Median 
Market-Wide Vacancy 13% 14% 13% 15% 13.2% 
Previous Quarter 10.5% 12.6% 11.7% 12.9% 12.2% 
First Quarter 2008 10.7% 11.3% 11.3% 12.5% 11.3% 
First Quarter 2007 11.5% 11.9% 12.5% N/A 11.9% 
      
CBD and Downtown Vacancy 8.0 10.2 8.33 10.46 8.7% 
Previous Quarter 6.6% 8.7% 5.1% 9.3% 7.6% 
First Quarter 2008 8.4% 8.9% 7.9% 10.2% 8.7% 
First Quarter 2007 8.9% 10.1% 9.5% N/A 9.5% 
CBD Class A Vacancy 5% 8% 7% 6% 6.3% 
Previous Quarter 3.8% 6.4% 5.1% 5.4% 5.3% 
First Quarter 2008 5.7% 6.1% 4.7% 6.2% 5.9% 
First Quarter 2007 5.3% 7.1% 6.4% N/A 6.4% 
CBD Class A Asking Rents 26.89 27.62 27.02 N/A  $27.02  
Previous Quarter $26.63 $27.07 $26.80 N/A  $26.80  
First Quarter 2008 $26.89 $26.02 $25.76 N/A  $26.02  
First Quarter 2007 $23.38  $24.68  $24.31  N/A  $24.31  
Suburban Vacancy 17% 17% 16% 17% 16.9% 
Previous Quarter 14.1% 16.3% 15.2% 16.2% 15.7% 
First Quarter 2008 12.8% 13.6% 13.4% 15.3% 13.5% 
First Quarter 2007 13.8% 13.7% 14.3% N/A 13.8% 
Suburban Class A Vacancy N/A 18% 17% 18% 17.5% 
Previous Quarter N/A 16.3% 15.2% 17.0% 16.3% 
First Quarter 2008 N/A 13.9% 12.7% N/A 13.3% 
First Quarter 2007 N/A 13.7% 10.5% N/A 12.1% 
Suburban Class A Asking 
Rents N/A  $ 22.95   $ 23.20  N/A  $23.08  
Previous Quarter N/A $24.48 $23.69 N/A  $24.09  
First Quarter 2008 N/A $24.33  $24.37  N/A  $24.35  
First Quarter 2007 N/A $23.36  $25.50  N/A  $24.43  
1 
 
 
Source:  CB Richard Ellis, Cushman & Wakefield, Grubb & Ellis, Norris, Beggs & Simpson Quarterly Reports and 
Statistical Reports, First Quarter 2009. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Vacancy rates above include subleases except those reported by CBRE.  CBD figures include close-in neighborhoods, 
except Class A figures reported by CBRE.  All rents are full service.  All other suburban figures include Vancouver. 
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Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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CBD Trends 
 
Norris, Beggs and Simpson noted that, “sublease space is becoming more prevalent”, which 
can be seen in the following graph based on the report by Cushman and Wakefield.  Sublease 
availability increased in the CBD, with 237,907 square feet available at quarter’s end.  Not 
surprisingly, subleases as a percentage of the direct vacancy also increased, up to 39.2% in 
this first quarter of 2009. However, it is still well below the peak seen in the fourth quarter of 
2002 when it reached 49.3%.  The CBD saw an increase in asking rents, which may mean that 
landlords are offering more concessions to lure tenants.  Absorption is negative with more office 
space coming on line than was absorbed by the market.   
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Office CBD Class A  Direct v. Sublease Availability (Sq. Ft.)
237,907
73,499
439,352
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
Q4
 20
01
Q2
 20
02
Q4
 20
02
Q2
 20
03
Q4
 20
03
Q2
 20
04
Q4
 20
04
Q2
 20
05
Q4
 20
05
Q2
 20
06
Q4
 20
06
Q2
 20
07
Q4
 20
07
Q2
 20
08
Q3
 20
08
Q4
 20
08
Q1
 20
09
Sq
ua
re
 Fe
et
Direct Availability
Sublease Availibility
 
Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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Suburbs:  
Most vacancies have been felt in the suburbs, 
especially southwest. Kruse Way was hit hard, but 
has seen some leasing activity.  According to 
Norris, Beggs and Simpson, Kruse Way vacancy fell 
as EthicsPoint leased 22,654 SF at 6000 Meadows.  
It may be offset by the completion of Kruse Oaks III 
which will soon add 110,000 SF in the second 
quarter of 2009.   The Tualatin/Wilsonville 
submarket shows the greatest vacancy rate of 
26.1%, although its current vacant square footage 
of 417,523 SF equals less than half the vacant 
square footage found in The Sunset Corridor, which 
had the highest total vacant square footage with 
1,062,048 SF currently vacant.   
 
       
 
*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First 
Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
Suburban Office Submarkets Ranked 
by Highest Percent of Vacancy 
Submarket Rank 
Vacancy 
Rate 
Camas       2  25% 
Cascade Park       4  18.8% 
Vancouver       9  13.2% 
Clackamas Sunnyside     12  9.30% 
Clark Co. Outlying       7  14.1% 
Columbia Corridor     10  12.8% 
Eastside     15  7.6% 
Hazel Dell/Salmon 
Creek     17  5.1% 
Johns 
Landing/Barbur Blvd       8  13.9% 
Northwest     16  6.7% 
Orchards     14  8.4% 
St. Johns/Central 
Vancouver     11  11.6% 
Sunset Corridor       2  25.3% 
SW/Beaverton/Sylvan       5  16.5% 
Tualatin/Wilsonville       1  26.1% 
Vancouver Mall     13  8.80% 
Washington Sq/Kruse 
Way       6  16.3% 
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Major Lease Transactions Q1 
2009    
Lessee Property Submarket 
Size 
(SF) 
Comcast of Tualatin Valley Tektronix Building 48, Bvrtn 
Sunset 
Corridor 118,612 
Northwest Evaluation 
Association 121 SW Everett St. Northwest 104,000 
Allstate Corp  Southwest Center I-5 South 36,912 
EthicsPoint 6000 Meadows Kruse Way 22,654 
Tonkon Torp LLP  Pioneer Tower  CBD 62,813 
Markowitz, Herbold, Glade & 
Mehlhaf Pacwest Center CBD 21,024 
Vestas America Harrison Square CBD 18,748 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, MarketView First Quarter 2009, Norris, Beggs & Simpson, "Market Summaries, Office 
Report 1Q09",  
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Portland Industrial Market 
 
 
The industrial sector has been hit hard by the recent spike in unemployment, which reached 
12.1% in March.  Overall median vacancy rates jumped to 7.8% compared to 5.5% in the first 
quarter of last year.  Grubb & Ellis note that the Portland Metro area delivered just over 
527,000 square feet this quarter with construction projects under way totaling 741,000 square 
feet, 415,000 of which will be occupied by FedEx in 2010.  Sublease space is becoming an 
important factor in the market as companies are unable to use all of the space they have 
leased.  Asking rates are holding steady, but as with the office and multifamily markets, 
brokers report that landlords are starting to give more concessions in response to market 
conditions.  Tenants have more options available to them.  Leasing agents also report having to 
pass on potential leases because of a lack of funding needed to provide requested tenant 
improvements, due to the tight credit market.   
INDUSTRIAL    Q1-09 CB Richard 
Ellis 
Cushman 
& 
Wakefield 
Grubb 
& Ellis 
Norris, 
Beggs & 
Simpson Median 
Market-wide Vacancy 7.3% 7.6% 8.0% 13.0% 7.8% 
Previous Quarter 6.4% 6.2% 6.9% 12.1% 6.6% 
First Quarter 2008 5.5% 5.5% 6.6% N/A 5.5% 
First Quarter 2007 5.2% 5.4% 6.1% N/A 5.4% 
        
Warehouse/Distribution 8.0% 7.3% 8.2% N/A 8.0% 
Previous Quarter N/A 6.6% 7.0% N/A 6.8% 
First Quarter 2008 N/A N/A 6.5% N/A 6.5% 
First Quarter 2007  N/A  4.6% 5.7% N/A 5.2% 
        
R&D/Flex Vacancy 10.1% 9.5% 7.2% 13.6% 9.8% 
Previous Quarter N/A 9.4% 6.7% 13.2% 9.4% 
First Quarter 2008 N/A 7.6% 6.8% N/A 7.2% 
First Quarter 2007 N/A 9.2% 7.4% N/A 8.3% 
        
Asking Monthly Shell Rates $0.40 N/A $0.42 N/A $0.41 
Previous Quarter $0.39  N/A $0.42  N/A $0.41  
First Quarter 2008 $0.38  N/A $0.42  N/A $0.40  
First Quarter 2007 $0.36  N/A $0.38  N/A $0.37  
        
Asking Monthly Flex Rates $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.81 N/A $0.81 
Previous Quarter $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.81 N/A $0.81  
First Quarter 2008 $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.81 N/A $0.81  
First Quarter 2007 $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.80 N/A $0.80  
 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Cushman and Wakefield, Norris, Beggs & Simpson, Quarterly Reports  
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Cushman & Wakefield report a negative absorption for all submarkets this quarter, except for 
the North/Northeast Portland.  Grubb & Ellis point out Rivergate as the submarket with the 
highest vacancy rate, currently at 11.4%, and the I-5 Corridor with the highest negative net 
absorption with just over 960,000 square feet, due at least in part to the 500,000 square feet 
Nike returned to the market.   
Submarket Vacancy and Absorption First Quarter 2009
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield Industrial Quarterly Summary, 1Q09 
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Source:  Grubb & Ellis Co., Industrial Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 
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Industrial Absorption and New Construction (Sq. Ft.)
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*Source:  Grubb & Ellis Co., Industrial Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 
Again this quarter, new construction outpaced absorption reversing a trend that started in 
2004. Grubb & Ellis report a negative absorption of <22,187> square feet in the fourth quarter, 
with 527,984 square feet of new construction delivered to the market. The nine year period 
spanning 2000-2008 averaged 2.8 million square feet per year absorption into the market.  The 
first quarter vacancy rate of 8% just surpasses the nine year average of 7.9%, and well below 
the low-point in 2003 of 11.6%.   
Norris, Beggs & Simpson report that SolarWorld plans to expand their solar facility in 
Hillsboro, adding a 210,000 square feet building, which may reflect the tax incentives Oregon 
provides to solar companies.  According to CB Richard Ellis, SolarWorld will employee 200 
construction workers during construction, and employ up to 1,000 people by the year 2011. 
Major Lease Transactions Q1 09   
Industrial       
Tenant Building  (Sq. Ft.) Submarket 
Wymore Transfer Wilhelm Distribution Center 170,000 Central 205 
OIA Global Logistics Bybee Lake Logistics Center 60,102 North/Northeast 
Apex Tigard Central Industrial Park 40,000 Southwest I-5 
Ernest Packaging 
Solutions PDX Corp Center South 62,150 North/Northeast 
O'Neill Transfer and 
Storage 2455 NW Nicolai 58,008 Northwest 
Leif's Auto Collision Nelson Business Center 49,900 Tigard/Southwest 
Mariner Productions 2811 NE Riverside Way 46,800 North/Northeast 
 Total 486,960  
*Source:  NAI Norris Beggs & Simpson, CB Richard Ellis, and Cushman & Wakefield, Industrial Quarterly Reports 
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Portland Multifamily Market 
 
 
 
According to Norris, Beggs & Simpson’s First Quarter 2009 Multifamily Report, the overall 
multifamily vacancy rate has increased in the first quarter to 4.96% compared to 3.80% this 
time last year, which is still much lower than other markets. It reports a total overall average 
rent of all apartments in the Portland metro area, from studios to 3BR/2BA, both new and 
seasoned units, to be $773 per unit or $0.89 per square foot.  Average 2BR/2BA new units 
rent for $1,179 per unit, an increase of $105 over last quarter.  Seasoned 2BR/2BA units rent 
for an average $822 per unit, which is an increase of only $2 over last quarter.  
Metro-Wide Average Rents First Quarter 2009
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Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report First Quarter, 2009,  
*Price per square foot shown in white 
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$739 $747 $761
$774
$738 $756
$785
$865
$1,179
$822
$726 $740
$1,074
$595
$635 $647 $641 $637 $637
$609 $632
$644
$715
$820
$550
$650
$750
$850
$950
$1,050
$1,150
$1,250
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1Q 09
Newer 2BR/2BA
Older 2BR/2BA
 
Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report First Quarter, 2009 
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Average Historical Rents & Rent Growth
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Source:  Brokers, Gary Winkler, and Beth DuPont, Colliers multifamily investment team, "Portland Multifamily Private 
Capital News, Year End 2008" 
 
 
 
The Clackamas/OR City/Milwaukie submarket shows the highest total vacancy rate at 6%, 
while SW Portland has the lowest submarket vacancy at 4.28%. 
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 Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report First Quarter, 2009 
Most sources agree that the single-family market continues to affect the multi-family market, 
as the “shadow inventory”, or the amount of available single family rentals as well as the rental 
of unsold condominiums, increased due to problems in those markets.  Mark Barry estimates a 
current 2.5 to 3.5 years of inventory in the condominium market.  He expects to see between 
2,500 and 3,500 new apartment units in 2009 as some investors take advantage of lower labor 
and material prices and less competition for high density sites from the condo and row house 
developers.   
 
As in other markets, landlords are starting to make concessions to attract and keep renters.  
Brokers from the Colliers Portland office, released results from a recent survey of advertised 
rental units, noting that “landlords are offering aggressive incentives, including free rent, 
favorable lease terms, free parking, and lower monthly rental rates to fill vacancy”.  The total 
discount of the net effective rent with parking and concessions in select buildings downtown 
range from 11% to 25%.  Suburban/Outer Portland survey results show lower discounts, in 
the 4% to 12% range.  As the chart below shows, rents have increased significantly since 2005 
while vacancy decreased.  Brokers at Colliers expect this trend to change in the coming year.   
      
 
 
 
 
Portland Metro Vacancy and Year on Year Rent Growth
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Source:  Mark D Barry, the Barry Apartment Report, Winter 2009     
 
 
 
 
Most experts forecast an increase in cap rates, which will decrease the market value of 
apartment buildings, especially those that were recently purchased.  Another challenge that 
investors face, as noted by Mark Barry, is an increase in utility costs of 11% for water and 
sewer, 14% for electric and natural gas, and 10% for garbage, which will increase operating 
costs.       
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Median Per Unit Sales Price and Median Cap Rate 
Four County Metro Area 2002-2008
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Source:  Mark D Barry, the Barry Apartment Report, Winter 2009 
 
 
 
The above graph based on the figures reported by Mark Barry, shows the inverse relationship 
between the median sales price and the cap rate of sales from 2002 to 2008, which illustrates 
how big the bubble has been.  The following graph produced by Colliers gives an example of 
how a rising cap rate will affect property values, and gives an indication of the expected trend 
reversal, until we reach the historical average 7% to 9% cap rate.  With lower property values 
as a result of increasing cap rates owners may be reluctant to sell and buyers may wait for 
further declines, which will reduce the number of transactions in the coming year.  Norris, 
Beggs & Simpson note that “cap rates will be calculated more conservatively with much more 
scrutiny on underwriting, in-place income, historic performance, cost of capital and market 
stability.” 
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Source:  Colliers, "Portland Multifamily Private Capital News, Year End 2008" 
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MAJOR SALE TRANSACTIONS       
Buyer Building Price Units Submarket 
Dan Piantanida Las Brisas $4,815,000 48 North/NE Portland 
David Kornblum The Village Apartments $4,700,000 60 Gresham/Troutdale 
Bristol Court 
Apt.Homes 
Bristol Court 
Apartments $3,850,000 48 Clackamas/Milwaukie 
RDC Acquisitions 
Elaine Station 
Apartments $2,600,000 39 North/NE Portland 
Stewart Terrace 
Apartments 
21754&21766 SW 
Sherwood Blvd $2,050,000 29 Sherwood 
Bannon Land 2 Midtown Apartments $1,630,000 22 Downtown 
Ivy Tree Ivy Tree Apartments $1,580,000 24 Southwest Portland 
 
Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson “Portland Area Multifamily Report First Quarter, 2009” 
 
 
